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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis responds to the question ‘how do firms grow sustainably?’ in dynamic 
environments as one of the fundamental questions in strategic management 
literature. It provides three concrete studies addressing various aspects of firm’s 
growth: the first study provides a theoretical study on the how of firm growth 
drawing on an open system perspective and resource-based view. It basically 
describes how firm’s resources grow and clarifies the characteristics that the 
resources show over time. The study is finalized by discussions on the 
heterogeneity of firms’ resources. The second study provides an empirical support 
for the first study and provides an empirical case on the successful and sustained 
growth of Airbus consortium over 20 years from 1967 to 1986. This study shows 
how the incremental accumulation of resources with a focus on a commonality 
strategy has contributed to the sustained growth of Airbus. In addition, the study 
shows two periods of growth (1) spark and establishment in the first decade of 
Airbus growth and (2) further technological advances afterwards. Finally, the last 
study provides a theory of an unexpected dissolved alliance interrupting the firm 
growth where the divorce directs the firm into crisis. It discusses how the firm can 
pass the crisis and return to its growth condition through the management of its 
resources. The study discusses how the change speed of resources could 
contribute to the management of resources in crisis. 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
The sustained growth of firm has been one of the central debates in the strategy 
literature to the date (Penrose 1959, Barney 1991, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). 
Over the years, it has resulted in two main questions about ‘why some firms 
outperform others in their environment’ and more importantly, ‘why some firms 
can sustainably keep their performance over time’ (Barney 1991, Crook et al. 
2008). These concerns have been at the heart of strategy literature since firms not 
only want to survive, but also want to keep a satisficing level of rent as the 
foundation of their sustainable growth over time (Barney 1991, Peteraf and 
Barney 2003). The inquiry has resulted in the development of various schools of 
thoughts in strategy literature over the previous decades (e.g., studies related to 
industry or firm attributes) addressing different aspects of the firm sustained 
growth (Connor 1991).  
 
Among the stated research streams, resource-based school of thought has been 
one of the dominant ones (Penrose 1959) answering the question on the growth of 
the firm in terms of sustained rent making (Barney 1991, Peteraf and Barney 
2003, Barney et al. 2011, Wernerfelt 1984). It basically brought the attention of 
scholars on firm internal resources (Wernerfelt 1984) and addressed the types of 
resources that make the firm able to create rent relative to their counterparts 
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(Barney 1991). These studies address the role of Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and 
Non-substitutable (VRIN) resources as the basis of firm sustained competitive 
advantage and rent making (Barney 1991, Dierickx and Cool 1989). In the same 
stream, the role of isolating mechanisms was additionally discussed contributing 
to the firm sustained competitive advantage (Peteraf 1993).  
 
Over the last two decades, numerous studies were conducted on VRIN within the 
resource-based school supporting the relationship between resources and firm 
competitive advantage and performance (Crook et al. 2008, Newbert 2007). While 
these studies support the role of the possession of such resources on the firm’s 
performance, they stay silent on the nature of dynamic environments (Teece et al. 
1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Wang and Ahmed 2006). Dynamic 
environments are identified with frequent and quick changes, such as shorter new 
product cycles or technological changes among others. In such conditions, 
resources may not be held as a source of competitive advantage and firms need to 
change these resources to sustain their growth over time (Teece et al. 1997, 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). 
 
In this line, dynamic capabilities are discussed as a source of firm sustained 
competitive advantage in the case of dynamic environments (Teece et al. 1997, 
Eisenhart and Martin 2000). These capabilities are defined as processes helping 
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firms to change and reconfigure their resources to meet the needs of their 
changing environments (Teece et al., 1997, Eisenhart and Martin 2000, Helfat et 
al. 2007). In fact, changes enabled by capabilities would help the firm grow 
sustainably in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
 
While studies on resource-based school have advanced to a great extent, there is 
still a request by dominant scholars for additional studies to extend the boundaries 
of the field (e.g. Barney et al. 2011, Peteraf et al. 2013, Ambrosini et al. 2009). 
The initial studies (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993) focused on ‘what’ types of 
resources (mainly VRIN) result in the firm rent making and its sustainability 
(Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). However, the question on ‘how’ these resources 
become the source of firm competitive advantage and in addition ‘how’ firms can 
keep their competitive advantage sustainably by changing their resources are still 
in progress in the literature (Barney et al. 2011; Peteraf et al. 2013). 
 
In this stream, while prior studies address the ways through which resources can 
be developed and reconfigured (Ambrosini et al. 2009), for instance, the processes 
that are contributing to the change and development of resources, there are less 
studies addressing how firm’s resources are accumulated and how this 
accumulation contribute to the firm performance and its sustainable growth 
(Barney 2011, Eriksson 2014, Danneels 2011). This directed us to formulate the 
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main question of this thesis as ‘how do firms grow sustainably?’ and approach it 
from resource accumulation theory (Dierickx and Cool 1989).  
 
Framing the thesis as a monograph based on three unpublished articles, we 
develop three essays to address the different aspects of the firm sustained growth. 
We believe the three studies provide a satisfactory foundation on the firm 
sustained growth since they present (1) how a firm can grow sustainably and (2) 
how it can manage unexpected conditions that interrupt the sustained growth. In 
addition, the three studies complement each other as it is discussed in the 
following paragraphs:  
 
The first study (chapter 3) provides the theoretical foundation of the thesis. In the 
study, drawing on a teleological perspective and the concept of resources, we 
theorize a firm as a bundle of resources and address how the firm can grow 
sustainably over time. In the study, we define a firm as a bundle of continuously 
moving resources and theorize on its growth over time in an accumulative and 
incremental way. In addition, we define growth as the continuous change in the 
state of the firm according to the firm objective. This study was accepted and 
presented in the Academy of Management Annual Meeting (Philadelphia 2014).  
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The second study (chapter 4) provides an empirical support for the first study and 
addresses how the firm growth can be sustained. In the second study, conducting 
an empirical study on Airbus, we describe and theorize on a successful case of 
growth in the commercial aircraft industry, a technology-intensive sector. We 
present the strategic growth of Airbus over 20 years since it was formed as a 
consortium in 1967 to the moment it became the pioneer of the commercial 
aviation industry in terms of technological advancements in 1987. In the study, we 
basically address how incremental accumulation of resources as the main pattern 
of Airbus growth (discussed in the first article) along with its technological 
advancements contributed to the sustainability of its competitive advantage and, 
as a result of that, its growth from 1967 to 1987. The results of our study yield 
two periods of Airbus growth (1) spark and establishment, and (2) technological 
investments and enforcement.  This paper is now under review in a peer-review 
journal.  
 
While the two previous chapters discuss how the firm sustained growth would be, 
the third study (chapter 5) complements them by addressing a shock that 
interrupts the firm sustained growth and discusses how the firm can return to its 
growth condition. In the study, while we contribute to the intersection of firm 
growth and alliance literatures, we assessed a case of a trajectory of unexpectedly 
dissolved alliance as an external shock that can significantly affect the growth of a 
firm. We theoretically address a case when due to a dissolved alliance, the firm 
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enters into a crisis condition. In such condition, we discuss how the characteristics 
of firm resources can be helpful to face its post-divorce crisis and return to its 
stable growth condition. The study was presented in the SMS conference in 2014 
(Madrid) and now is under review in a peer-review journal.   
 
We develop an overarching framework (in chapter 2) to provide a review of 
current studies in the field, point out our research question and the gap in the 
literature, and explain how our three articles fill this gap. At the end, it is worth 
mentioning that our study mainly contributes to the firm sustained growth in the 
resource-based streams of studies in the strategy literature.  
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2.1 Overarching Framework 
 
Following the previous chapter addressing the overall structure of the thesis, in 
this chapter, we present a review of key studies conducted in the strategy literature 
and address the gap in this area. Since the thesis sits at studies in the area of 
resource-based school of thought and strategic alliances, we have provided a 
review of the literature on the following debates from the strategic management 
perspective: (2.2) a review of theoretical and empirical studies on RBV, (2.3) 
strategic alliances from the view of resources/capabilities, and (2.4) dynamic 
capabilities. The reason for this review is that our study covers the firm internal 
growth based on its dynamic capabilities and the external growth through strategic 
alliances. In this line, Table 2.1 presents studies central to the development of this 
thesis. 
 
Author Year Area 
Penrose 1959 Resource-based View 
Dierickx and Cool 1989 Resource-based View 
Barney  1991 Resource-based View 
Peteraf 1993 Resource-based View 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997 Dynamic Capabilities 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000 Dynamic Capabilities 
Wang and Ahmed  2006 Dynamic Capabilities 
 
Table 2.1 Key Theoretical Articles of Study 
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2.2 Resource-Based View  
 
Firm growth has been one of the central debates in the strategy literature to the 
present (Penrose 1959, Barney 1991, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). In this regard, 
over the last 50 years, two questions have been at the center of studies in strategic 
management literature: ‘how can firms make rent?’ and more importantly ‘how 
can they sustain the rent in long term?’ (Barney 1991). In other words, ‘why some 
firms outperform others’ and ‘why they can keep their performance over time’ 
(Crook et al. 2008). These questions have been central in strategy studies since 
firms are not only interested in making rent once, but they also want to keep that 
rent as the base of their sustainable growth. This inquiry has resulted in the 
formation and evolution of different schools of strategy studies focusing on, for 
instance, the role of industry or the firms’ attributes (Connor 1991).  
 
In this vein, the RBV (Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993, Barney 1991, Conner 
1991), that started by the seminal study by Penrose (1959) on the growth of the 
firm, brought the role of firm resources at the center of attention. The RBV 
addressed the role of internal resources of a firm (Barney 1991) at a moment when 
the dominant perspectives in the strategy literature (e.g., industry-based studies) 
were focused on the role of the external environment on the firm rent making 
(Mahoney 2001). It basically assumes the existence of a series of internal 
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heterogeneous resource bundles (both tangible and intangible) that enable the firm 
to deliver a value unique to its environment (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993).  
  
Barney (1991), in his study, proposes that resources which are Valuable, Rare, 
Inimitable, and Non-substitutable (VRIN) are the source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Those firms possessing these resources are able to deliver 
a unique value to their customers and make rent through better efficiency and 
effectiveness; at the same time being in-imitable, non-substitutable, and rare help 
to achieve a sustained competitive advantage and grow over time. Inimitability 
means the resources are difficult to duplicate and not every firm can develop such 
resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989); non-substitutability addresses that there are 
not other resources that provide the same or similar value, and rarity means that 
the resources are not held by many firms in the market (Barney 1991).  
 
In a similar discussion, Peteraf (1993) approaches the sustainability of 
competitive advantage through addressing four main underlying factors: 
heterogeneity of resources, ex post limit to competition, imperfect mobility, ex 
ante limit to competition. The existence of heterogeneity between firms provides 
the chance of rent creation. Ex post limit to competition basically addresses the 
isolating mechanisms with which the firm can hinder competitors from access to 
the firm resources. Imperfect mobility emphasizes the role of isolating 
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mechanisms that give the firm the chance to keep its superior resource inside the 
firm, such as licensing. Finally, ex post limit to competition discusses the position, 
which the firm is to capture, and which competitors should not have already taken 
intensively.  
 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) develop another approach to the firm competitive 
advantage. The study defines the firm strategic assets as “the set of difficult to 
trade and imitate, scare, and appropriable and specialized resources and 
capabilities that bestow the firm’s competitive advantage”. However, the study 
goes beyond the approach by Barney (1991) and discusses that the firm 
competitive advantage and rent making should be considered in relation with a 
series of complementary factors present in the firm environment named strategic 
industry factors. The authors discuss these factors cannot be completely identified 
ex ante and are determined according to the firm’s competitors, customers, 
innovators external to the industry, etc. As a result, there is the need to consider 
both strategic assets and strategic industry factors in the case of rent making.  
 
Looking at the development of the RBV, after the seminal study by Penrose 
(1959), in the 80s Resource-school emerged with initial studies by Lippman and 
Rumelt (1982), Wernerfelt (1984), and Barney (1986). These studies continued 
until Barney’s main article in 1991 which was named the “resource-based view of 
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the firm and sustained competitive advantage”. In the 90s as the second decade, a 
significant number of studies were conducted on the view till 1996 when an article 
based on the RBV won the best paper award of the AMJ (Barney et al. 2011). In 
fact, these studies were investigating whether one or more types of resources 
would affect the firm rent making.  
 
In this line, McElivy and Chakravarthy (2002) investigated the role of complexity, 
tacitness, and specificity of firm resources on the sustainability of firm 
competitive advantage. The results of the study show that the stated attributes can 
work as imitation barriers and sustain the firm competitive advantage over time. 
Makadok (1999) seeks to address whether different firms with different 
production functions, which are represented by different resources and 
capabilities, result in the differences between firm performances measured as 
market share. The result of the study supports the idea that those firms with better 
resources, capabilities, and production function gain a better market share at the 
expense of their competitors.  
 
Maijoor et al. (1996) discussed the role of regulations as a type of resource 
contributing to the firm sustainable competitive advantage. The study supports the 
isolating role of regulation in helping a group of auditing firms to create sustained 
rent over almost a decade of their activities. Douglas et al. (2002) discussed the 
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role of firm strategic competencies as resources held by firms contributing to their 
sustained competitive advantage. The study supports that the ability of firms to 
develop new products and services, addressing the need of customers, is a 
strategic competence and the base of firms’ sustained competitive advantage.  
 
Furthermore, as a branch of the RBV, Knowledge-Based View (KBV) was 
introduced. KBV basically considers knowledge as the main source of 
competitive advantage. Clarifying the characteristics of knowledge, Grant (1996) 
develops a KBV and considers “the primary role of firm as integrating the 
specialist knowledge resident in individuals into goods and services”. It discusses 
the problems related to the coordination of knowledge and cooperation between 
individuals as key challenges within the firm, for which the author proposes a 
series of ways from setting rules and directives to group problem solving. This 
view points out appropriate organizational structures according to the properties 
of knowledge that could go from hierarchy to team-based forms. Finally, the KBV 
addresses the relative efficiency in knowledge utilization as a criterion for setting 
the boundary of the firm whether the firm has to be active in one or more product 
markets.   
 
Following the above studies, in the third decade, an increasing number of studies 
on the area have been summarized through several meta-analyses. Newbert (2007) 
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through a meta-review of over 300 articles about resource-based view supported 
the role of resources and emphasized the role of firm processes on the firm 
competitive advantage and higher performance. Crook et al. (2008) through a 
meta analysis of 124 key articles conducted on the RBV, supported the central 
debate by Barney (1991) on the role of VRIN resources on firm sustainable rent 
making. In fact, the study shows that, in average, firms with VRIN resources had 
a better performance in comparison to those without such resources as the central 
debate by the RBV. 
 
2.3 Resource-Based View and Strategic Alliances  
 
While the studies provided above address the central debate by RBV in the case of 
various types of resources such as competencies and strategies, RBV has also 
been applied in various contexts such as strategic alliances. The literature 
considers alliances among prominent ways with which firms grow and sustain 
their competitive advantage (Ireland et al. 2002). Das and Teng (2000), in their 
study, extended the RBV in the context of alliances and addressed several main 
aspects of alliances such as their rationale and formation.  
  
The rationale of alliances has been related to the possibility of value-creation and 
firm growth based on the pooling of two parties’ resources (Das and Teng 2000). 
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In fact, firms look for various resources from their partners, specifically when 
they do not have all resources in-house to grow alone (Ireland et al. 2002) or when 
they have a vulnerable position in their market (Einsenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1996). In this line, various studies discuss the possibility of exploiting the 
resources of their partners or establish joint activities with their partners (Hitt et 
al., 2000, Doz 1996). As a result, an alliance and resources allocated to it, if 
managed properly, can become a concrete source of growth and firm competitive 
advantage over time (Ireland et al. 2002).  
 
Regarding the structure of alliances, RBV suggests the possibility of various 
forms of alliances from equity joint ventures to minority equity joint ventures, 
bilateral contract, and unilateral contracts (Das and Teng, 2000). In fact, 
depending on the nature and level of resources allocated to their alliances, parties 
may need to show various levels of commitment to their alliance (Doz 1996, 
Arino et al. 1998). In this line, for instance, the easier resources can be taken over 
by the other party or in other words the higher the risk of an alliance, more 
stronger relationships will be needed to commit parties to the alliance (Gulati et 
al. 2008).  
 
The RBV has also been applied in the termination of alliances. Cui et al. (2011), 
surveying 150 alliances, found that firms’ resource deployment and partnering 
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strategy affect the propensity of alliance termination through affecting the 
uniqueness of partnering resources. They discuss that resource redundancy due to 
the growth of the firm in the area of partnership result could in a higher likelihood 
of a focal alliance termination. Lunnan and Haugland (2008) supported that 
strategically important alliances are terminated less abruptly and established 
alliances are less in danger of termination.  
 
 
2.4 Dynamic capabilities  
 
While the initial studies in RBV address the role of resources on the firm 
sustained competitive advantage, dynamic capabilities as a branch of RBV 
addressed the condition of the firm in the context of dynamic environments 
(Barney 2001). Dynamic capabilities are considered as capacities and processes 
helping the firm to reconfigure its resource base, address the needs of its changing 
environment, and make its growth sustainable (Teece et al. 1997).  
 
Teece et al. (1997) define dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments” (p. 516). Eisenhart and Martin (2000) defines these 
capabilities as processes helping the firm to be able to adapt itself with the 
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changing needs of dynamic environments. Helfat et al. (2007: 4) define dynamic 
capabilities as ‘the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, and 
modify its resource base’ where the ‘resource base’ includes the ‘tangible, 
intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities which the 
organization owns, controls, or has access to on a preferential basis’ to keep its fit 
with its environment.  
 
Looking at the strategy literature on dynamic capabilities, while still in progress, it 
can be divided into three streams (Eriksson 2014):  
 
The first stream is related to the studies addressing the factors that affect the 
development of dynamic capabilities. Schriber and Lowstedt (2014) in their study 
explore and show how different types of firms’ tangible resources affect the 
development of firm capabilities. Their results show how similar tangible 
resources applied in new product developments can result in the development of 
different capabilities and that could affect the firms’ new product development 
outcomes. Narayanan et al. (2009), conducting a multiple case study, support a 
process model of new product development, from articulation to finalization, 
contribute to the development of firm capabilities and sustainable growth over 
time. 
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The second stream clarifies the nature of dynamic capabilities and considers these 
capabilities as capacities or processes that help the firm to purposefully change its 
resources  (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, Winter 2003, Helfat et 
al. 2007). Teece et al. (1997), in this line, considers the role of processes, position, 
and paths as forming factors of dynamic capabilities. Similarly, we consider these 
dynamic capabilities as organizational and managerial processes for which firms 
need to consider their internal and external conditions, ways, and position in their 
environment (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
 
Winter (2003) divides capabilities into two groups: first order and second order 
capabilities. The first order capabilities are those that are contributing to the daily 
activities of the firm, those with which the firm ‘makes a living’. The second 
order (or higher order) capabilities as dynamic capabilities are those that 
contribute to the change of lower order capabilities and firm resources. In this 
line, for instance, Schilke (2014) found that second order alliancing capabilities 
contribute to the firm better performance through changing first order capabilities. 
In addition, it has been found that the two types of capabilities have a substitutive 
effect on each other.  
 
The third stream looks at the impact of dynamic capabilities on the firm’s 
performance whether these capabilities bring about a higher performance or not. 
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The main discussion here addresses that capabilities, through changing resources 
contribute to a higher firm’s performance (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Schilke 
(2014) supports this perspective finding that dynamic capabilities affect the firm 
performance through lower-order capabilities. In this line, Newbert (2007) found 
that those firms possessing necessary changing processes as dynamic capabilities 
showed a better performance versus the ones that did not have such capabilities.  
 
Along with the studies reviewed above that address the key aspects of capabilities 
in the area, several studies in the domain of strategy address how firms grow by 
elaborating the role of dynamic capabilities and their relationship with resources. 
It is worth mentioning that, regarding our focus on how firms grow, we 
additionally looked for studies on growth in strategy literature and its intersection 
with resource-based studies to show the state of the art in this area. In the 
following paragraph, a review of these studies will be provided: 
 
Several studies emphasize the role of firm new product development activities as 
a key factor in sustaining the firm competitive advantage and growth over time. 
Leonard-Barton (1991), investigates the role of dynamic capabilities on the firm 
competitive advantage and growth as a way of avoiding decline within firms. In 
her study, the author empirically supports that capabilities play both enabling and 
hindering effects on the firm’s product development activities as the base of 
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competitive advantage and growth. Narayanan et al. (2009) develop and support a 
process model of new product development as the base of firm growth.  
 
Danneels (2002) in his study presents a set of firms which have been trying to 
avoid a decline situation through developing their technological and customer 
competencies in interaction with their new product development activities. The 
study elaborates how the newness of a specific competency, that the firms were to 
develop, required different forms of development mechanisms. Finally, the study 
shows that firms depending on their external condition could follow a specific 
path of development of competencies over time. Danneels (2011), conducting a 
single case study based on an in-decline firm in the typewriter industry, discusses 
how the firm tried to go outside its decline situation through applying various 
changes processes. The study shows that, despite of the changes, managers’ 
limitation in realizing the potential of their resources, the overlook of some of 
their capabilities, and a wrong perception about their environment finally could 
not stop the firm from getting into bankruptcy.  
 
Rindova and Kotha (2000), conducting a case study analysis, related firm 
sustainable competitive advantage to continuous change in the case of fast 
changing environment. They found that firms need to keep a transient competitive 
advantage to be able to answer the changing needs of their environment and 
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experience sustainable growth in the case of fast changing environments. The 
results of this study magnify the role of firm dynamic capabilities and strategic 
flexibility in achieving such continuous change over time. Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997), conducting a multiple case study in a fast changing environment, found 
that appropriate management of new product development activities was the base 
of sustainable growth of successful firms over the period of study.  
 
Raff (2000) looking at two bookstore firms (Borders and Barns) over 30 years 
found how their dynamic capabilities had been contributing to the firms’ growth 
and to the development of new resources firstly as local and after as national 
providers of books in the U.S. The study basically shows firstly how the firms’ 
capabilities were originated according to different objectives with which these 
firms started, and secondly how capabilities over time contributed to distinctive 
forms of growth: in one case around it was book keeping systems (Borders), and 
in the other the management of the scale of the company (Barn). Holbrook et al. 
(2000) assessed the role of firms’ external environments beside internal conditions 
and questioned how growth results in the heterogeneity of four firms in the semi-
conductor industry in 50s and 60s in the US. While the study finds the role of 
firms’ environment as the major factor, at the same time it finds that the firms’ 
objectives and their R&D capabilities have played a key role on the survival and 
heterogeneity of the four firms in a 10 to 15 years life span. 
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2.5 Aim of the Thesis 
 
Following the literature discussed above, several scholars (e.g., Barney et al. 
2011) point out that RBV has got to a level of maturity and that it is necessary to 
revitalize the theory through further advancing its dynamic aspects, further 
elaborating on the change mechanisms, or/and addressing its connections with 
other theories, and/or increasing the explanatory power of the theory in new 
phenomena. This need, in addition, intersects with Porter’s (1991) study on the 
need for a dynamic resource-based theory of strategy as a missing piece of the 
strategy literature. Porter (1991) in this regard raises some questions on resource-
based school and describes the characteristics of a resource-based theory such as 
its dynamic characteristics and its explanatory aspects including the origin of 
resources.  
 
While the dominant RBV studies support the ‘what’ question in the field (as 
discussed and reviewed before), the question on “how” of firm competitive 
advantage and growth, specially in the context of dynamic environments, has been 
less explored (Barney et al. 2011). For this, the connection of resource-based view 
to other theories and explaining underlying processes has been one of the 
Barney’s suggestions for further contributions to RBV (Barney et al. 2011). As a 
result, the current state of studies in resource-based school and the requests by the 
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scholars in the field (Barney et al., 2011, Peteraf et al. 2013) directed us to 
advance a new theoretical approach drawing on an open system theory as the first 
study of this thesis.  
 
First Study (Chapter 3): In our first study, a teleological perspective (Open-
system perspective) will be adapted to bring a dynamic nature into the RBV. The 
perspective has a dynamic nature and considers ‘a set of components that are in 
continuous interaction with each other, evolving toward an objective’. We will 
discuss the interaction of components with their external environment and how 
through this interaction different components grow and get new specifications. 
The perspective will help us to respond to the emphasis on improving the 
explanation power of RBV while maintaining its simplicity (Barney et al. 2011).  
 
Drawing on the teleological perspective, we will theorize on “how” firms’ 
resources continuously grow and enable the firm to sustainably capture abnormal 
returns in dynamic environments. For this aim, firstly we will theorize the firm as 
a bundle of continuously evolving resources. After that, we will discuss the 
interaction of the firm with its external environment and how it contributes to the 
firm growth (Van de Ven et al. 1995). Following that, we will discuss the 
accumulation of resources over time as the underlying basis of the firm’s growth 
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and point out its characteristics (Dierickx et al. 1989). Finally, we will clarify how 
the items discussed above result in the heterogeneity of resources.  
 
Second Study (Chapter 4): in this second study, we will address the lack of 
empirical studies in the area (Ambrosini et al. 2009, Helfat et al. 2013). Since the 
stream is still advancing, the need for qualitative studies has been emphasized 
(Danneels 2011). In addition, while prior studies mainly focus on a firm decline 
(Danneels 2011), growth has rather been less explored. Our study contributes to 
the literature by providing a more complete picture of growth through connecting 
resources, capabilities, and competitive advantage over time. It basically 
addresses how the firm accumulates resources to have a sustained growth. For this 
issue, we will conduct a case study on the successful growth of AIRBUS in the 
commercial aviation (aircraft) industry, a dynamic and technology intensive 
industry. We will theorize on the growth of AIRBUS and provide a process-based 
framework of continuous resource accumulation central to the growth and 
competitive advantage of AIRBUS over 20 years. In accordance with the first 
study, we will investigate if the incremental accumulation of resources contributed 
to the sustainable growth of Airbus. Finally, these two studies (chapter 3 and 4) 
will give us the basis to go to the third study.   
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Third Study (Chapter 5): Finally, for the third study, Barney et al. (2011) point 
out that the new theorizations can address new phenomena contributing to the 
explanatory power of the RBV. For this study, we will focus on an unexpected 
terminated alliance as an external shock that can push the firm outside of its 
growth condition. In fact, shocks are relevant phenomena that can affect the firm 
growth (Chakrabarti 2014). This is also in line with prior studies that address how 
post-divorce crisis can result in the complete exit of firms from their businesses 
which needs further investigation (Gulati et al. 2008, Harrison 2004). Most of 
studies in the literature focus on alliances before the point of termination. Despite 
of its importance, both alliance and resource-based literatures have remained 
silent on post-divorce crisis of parties who get into crisis (Gulati et al. 2008, 
Harrison 2004, Bruner and Spekman 1998).  
 
Regarding our contribution to the resource-based school and alliance termination 
literature, it can be seen that most of studies focus on termination of alliances 
before the point of termination and there is no study to the present that looks at the 
post-divorce crisis of an alliance party. Previous studies that cover alliance 
termination can be divided into two main stream: (1) studies that examine “why” 
alliances terminate or in other words address the causes of alliance termination 
(Cui et al. 2011, Cui and Kumar 2012, Lunnan and Haugland 2008, Xia 2011); 
and (2) studies that examine “how” alliances terminate and argure the processes 
by and/or ways through which an alliance is terminated (Alajoutsijärvi et al. 2000, 
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Peng and Shenkar 2002, Gulati et al. 2008, Tähtinen 2002). As a result, as a very 
relevant and timely study we will contribute to the intersection of RBV and 
alliance termination literature to address the post-divorce crisis of a failed party. 
We mainly argue how a failed party can manage the crisis of its ex-alliance to 
return to a stable growth condition according to the characteristics of its resources.  
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Chapter 3: 
Unfolding Dynamic Change: A Teleological, 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
Considering and explaining movement as the cause of formation of all 
resources, we provide a dynamic resource based theory to describe a firm 
growth. Mainly drawing on open-system theory (teleological perspective), 
we consider a firm as a bundle of continuously moving resources that is a 
sub-set of a bigger environment of moving resources morphing toward an 
objective. Firstly, we clarify what the movement is, how it unfolds, and how 
as a result of that, resource bundles progress toward the firm objective in an 
incremental way. Then, we discuss how strategic choice and determinism, 
as the two main forces, give the firm ability to partly shape its destiny and 
its environment while at the same time it is being shaped by its 
environment. Finally, we discuss on the characteristics of a firm growth and 
the heterogeneity of resources bundles as a central debates in strategy 
literature. We finalize our article by providing examples from strategy 
literature.  
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Until now, the continuous management of change for the sustainable growth of a 
firm through the creation of a sustainable (competitive and comparative) advantage 
has been the center of attention in strategy studies (Barney 1991, Wernerfelt 1984, 
Porter 1991, Barney et al. 2011, Crook et al. 2008). In this vein, Resource-Based 
Theory (RBT) of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993, Barney 1991, Conner 
1991) is one of the dominant research programs (Lockett et al. 2008) addressing 
this concern. RBT addressed the role of internal resources in a firm at a moment 
when the dominant perspectives in strategy literature (e.g., Industrial Organization) 
were focused on the role of the external environment on the firm rent (Mahoney 
2001). It basically assumes the existence of a series of internal heterogeneous 
resource bundles (both tangible and intangible) that enables the firm to deliver a 
value unique to its configuration of resources (Barney 1991). In fact, those 
resources that are Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-substitutable (VRIN) 
(Barney 1991). In this line, Crook et al. (2008), conducting a meta-analysis of 
studies on RBT over almost 16 years, showed the higher performance of firms with 
VRIN resources supporting the central debate by Barney (1991).  
 
After the initial studies on RBT (Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993, Barney 1991, 
Conner 1991), as a new stream, dynamic capabilities were introduced as the 
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underlying factors in creating change and keeping the sustainability of firms’ 
competitive advantages (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece 
2007). These capabilities were defined as firm capacities to modify and keep its 
resource basis relevant to its continuously changing environment over time (Teece 
et al. 1997). In this line, the following studies addressed resource management (e.g., 
Sirmon et al. 2007) and the demography of resources (Kim and Kuilman 2013) in 
bringing about the necessary changes and sustainably keeping the firm competitive 
advantages. Sirmon et al. (2007), addressing the need for further elaboration of 
change (bundling) mechanisms of resources, provide the discussion on “structuring 
resource portfolio, bundling of resources to build capabilities, and leveraging 
capabilities to provide value to customers” (Sirmon et al. 2007). Following that, 
Kim & Kuilman (2013) supported the role of the stated bundling mechanisms such 
as addition, modification, and removal on sustainably keeping the firm advantage 
advantages.  
 
Despite the advances in the literature, there is emphasis on the need of further 
studies to improve the explanation power of the theory while maintaining its 
simplicity (Barney et al. 2011). Barney et al. (2011) mention that there is the need 
to revitalize RBT through further elaboration of change mechanisms or/and its 
connections with other theories to explain the same phenomena and increase the 
explanatory power of the theory. This need interestingly intersects with Porter’s 
(1991) study on the need for a dynamic theory of strategy (as a dynamic theory of 
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the firm) as a missing piece of the strategy literature. Porter (1991) raises some 
questions and describes the characteristics of the dynamic resource-based theory 
(such as its dynamic characteristics) and explanatory aspects (such as the origin of 
resources). That “how” basically firm resources get to a point (e.g. VRIN or 
heterogeneity in a more general term) enabling a firm to capture abnormal return. 
These concerns open an avenue for us to further clarify “how” a firm dynamically 
unfolds to be able to sustainably create an abnormal level of return over time.   
 
For this aim, drawing on open-system perspective, the concept of resource bundles, 
and considering a firm as the unit of analysis, we clarify the dynamics of a firm 
growth by taking a normative approach. First, we consider a firm as a bundle 
(Penrose 1959) of continuously moving resources that are evolving as a sub-set of a 
bigger bundle of resources (the environment) toward an objective. We discuss how, 
due to the movement in an accumulative way, the firm grows over time through 
the interaction of its internal resources along the interaction with its external 
environment. As a result of this growth, the firm as a bundle of resources 
transforms continuously toward its objective. In addition, through this growth, the 
firm partly shapes both itself and its environment through its strategic choices 
while at the same time it is partly shaped by its deterministic environment. Finally, 
these are diverging and converging forces that result in the heterogeneity or 
similarity of firms as bundles of resources within an environment.  
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Our study mainly contributes to the strategy literature, specifically, studies in 
resource-based theory and dynamic capabilities through explaining the “how” of 
the firm growth (as a bundle of resources) through its continuous interaction with its 
external environment. It can also be considered a dynamic theory of strategy as it 
satisfies the criteria addressed by Porter (1991), mainly by addressing (1) both the 
internal and external conditions of the firm, (2) the continuous change of the 
environment (exogenous change), and (3) the role of the firm in shaping its 
environment. Finally, our theory can be considered an initial step to a theory of 
resource bundles, of which the firm can be one of these bundles.  
 
 
3.3 The Firm as a Bundle of Evolving Resources  
 
As the starting point in our theory, we consider the whole environment within which 
the firm is active as a “space” (Witteloostuijn and Boone 2006) of continuously 
moving and expanding interconnected resources. We consider movement, while 
standing on its own, as an independent continuously self-generating Being as the 
main cause of configuration and formation of resources. This is in fact the 
movement resulting in the interaction of resources with each other and makes it 
possible to understand (1) a firm and (2) change in general. As a result, a firm can 
be defined as a bundle (Penrose 1959) of continuously moving resources that are 
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evolving as a sub-set of a bigger bundle of resources (the environment) that all 
together are morphing toward an objective. These resources can take the forms of 
and be defined as “assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. [both tangible and intangible] controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Barney 1991). This is in fact in line with the open-system 
theory (teleological change perspective) in which the whole environment is 
considered as a system of interconnected components that are continuously 
interacting to reach an objective (Van de Ven and Poole 1995). Figure 3.1 shows a 
visualization of a firm within the stated continuously moving environment. 
 
Figure 3.1 Firm Growth State 
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In the following, (1) we define what a firm state is, (2) clarify our conceptualization 
of resource space, (3) address how movement unfolds under open-system theory, 
and (4) discuss strategic choice and determinism as the basis of our theory and 
continue our discussion afterwards. 
 
3.3.1 State 
 
We define states as the characteristics (attributes, qualities, and quantities) that 
can become actualized within resources. By actualization we mean emanation of 
these characteristics into resources that basically deliver the essence of resources. 
This actualization for instance can be (1) observed in the ongoing change of the 
nature (such as change in seasons, day and night, etc.) or can be (2) done by a 
conscious actor through instrumentalization or verbalization such as playing a 
musical instrument or writing (consequently), that can be either planned or 
emergent. As a result, by a firm state, we mean both tangible and intangible 
characteristics (qualities and quantities) of the firm that can be captured through 
observation of already actual or emergent resources, such as a firm’s assets, 
employees, properties, processes, knowledge, trust, reputation, culture, revenue, 
costs, etc. (Barney 1991).  
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3.3.2 Resource Space and Movement 
 
For simplicity of understanding, we assume the existence of a space with infinite 
states embedded within the movement and beside that a space of “the resource”. 
Due to the movement and as a result of interactions among resources, these infinite 
states can emanate (Conner 1991) into the resource space; however, if these two 
spaces exist, they are not separate. The emanation due to the movement has an 
original point (e.g., the big bang) and unfolds in a “path-dependent” way. By path-
dependency, we mean the connectivity between the two states: between (1) the 
states that have become actual and (2) the potential states that have the potential of 
actuality (Cockburn et al. 2000), when a resource bundle (as a firm) morphs from 
one configuration to another potential one (Augier and Teece 2008, Augier and 
Teece 2009). This means that at the observation point of a resource bundle (e.g., a 
firm), depending on the path that the resource bundles have gone through to a point 
(Cockburn et al. 2000, Noda and Collis 2001), there will be a series of potential 
states into which the resource bundle can become actual.  
        
In the following we address how movement unfolds in resources and a firm as a 
bundle of resources comes into actuality:  
         
• Firstly, the movement, and as the result of that, resources grow (or 
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are formed) in an accumulative way (Dierickx and Cool 1989, 
Maritan and Peteraf 2011, Amit and Schoemaker 1993). In this 
growth, dynamic capabilities (specially R&D capabilities), while 
themselves are bundles of resources, act as the main forces of 
movement that push the bundle forward both in terms of 
accumulation and reconfiguration of resource bundles (Teece et al. 
1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). The stated accumulation 
between the two actual and potential states could be in terms of 
similarity for example in the case of firm R&D activities or 
acquisitions (Maritan and Peteraf 2011, Helfat and Lieberman 2002). 
However, it is worth mentioning that the potential states are not 
necessarily dependent on the contextual locus of resource 
accumulation and the sparking point of accumulation can come from 
another area due to the interconnectedness of asset stocks (Dierickx 
and Cool 1989). For instance, the resources (e.g. knowledge) 
accumulated in one context (e.g. department, business unit, product, 
etc.) can be applied and contribute to the growth of another context 
once the firm sparks the growth of the new (or another) department, 
business units, products, etc. This is in fact due to the available 
communalities, in terminology of Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), at a 
specific level of abstraction between at least two resource bundles, 
while they could be contextually different.  
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• Second, as we have taken an open-system perspective, the key aspect 
in the theorization backs to the interaction of a firm with its external 
environment (please see Figure 3.2). Input of resources into the firm 
(assets, knowledge, energy basis, new acquired units, etc.), output of 
resources from the firm to the environment (products, externalities, 
knowledge, etc.), and the sharing of resources between the firm and 
its environment can be considered as key forms of interaction 
between the firm and its environment (Rousseau 1979, Koza and 
Lewin 1998). Through this interaction, while the firm (as bundle of 
resources) grows on its own, at the same time it has a level of growth 
with its environment (Murmann 2013, Koza and Lewin 1998, Lewin 
et al. 1999). In the former (internal growth), these are internal sparks 
around which resources accumulate, while in the case of external 
growth these are external sparks such as alliances or collaborations 
that start the accumulation of resources (Murmann 2013, Koza and 
Lewin 1998, Lewin et al. 1999). It is worth mentioning that at the 
same time, the environment on its own has also its own level of 
growth due to the movement of other resource bundles within the 
environment (Murmann 2013, Koza and Lewin 1998, Lewin et al. 
1999). 
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Figure 3.2 A Bundle of Resources and its Interaction with the Environment 
 
• Third, a potential state of resources is not necessarily already known 
(e.g. codified) and stocked (as a result of accumulation). This means 
that it can become stocked during the process of accumulation, 
which can be both planned/intentional or emergent (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997). For instance, firms are not necessarily aware of 
the final products or their following strategies and they will come up 
after their expansion or product development activities (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997).   
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potential states that become actualized as asset mass stocks 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989, Helfat 1997). Finally, there is an evolving 
maximum level (rate) of evolution capacity of a resource bundle (e.g., 
firm) such that the bundle cannot exceed due to time compression 
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool 1989) and the scarcity (e.g. 
strategic market factors) and limitations (e.g. property rights) of the 
resources (as input constraints) (Barney 1991).  
        
For instance, consider an R&D-based firm in a high velocity industry where the 
firm growth and survival is highly dependent on the processes of new product 
development and accumulated resources within the firm (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1997). A new product becomes actualized after a period of research, design, and 
test: a potential state of resource bundles (final product A) has come into actuality 
based on the initial state of resources (e.g. the R&D knowledge of the firm as an 
initial level resource stock and complexity inherent within it), the activities 
performed when discovering or creating the product (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), 
and the resources entered into the firm as inputs. Following the new product 
(named A), the firm may have the chance to introduce another new product (assume 
B) based on the current stock of strategic resources (e.g. knowledge) accumulated 
through the initiation of the previous product (new potential complex states) 
(Schoemaker 1990). However, there is a maximum level of growth rate in the 
process due to the limitations on input such as property rights (Barney 1991) or the 
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necessary amount of time for internal accumulation of the necessary missing stocks 
due to unavailability in the strategic factor market (Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
Assuming the firm evolves around its new products, what happens is that different 
bundles of resources embedded within the firm (e.g. structure, processes, and 
arrangement) continuously change to make the firm able to keep its fit level with its 
environment (Rindova and Kotha 2001).  
 
3.3.3 Progress and Continuous Change of Resources as Outcome 
 
As an important result of the movement, resource bundles continuously change and 
become actual regarding the firm objective (Rindova and Kotha 2001). In fact, this 
is the way that we define progress as the dynamic and continuous change in the 
state of resources moving toward the firm objective. However, it is worth 
mentioning that our theorization is more tangible in the case of high velocity 
industries (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), where the rapid pace of technological 
change and the high level of uncertainty push the firms to change their strategies 
and reconfigure their resources continuously (Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). This is when firms are continuously transforming themselves from 
one state to another state to be able to keep both internal fit between its different 
components as a system and external fit with their environment (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997). The provided discussion is nicely described as continuous 
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morphing in the terminology of Rindova and Kotha (2001) when the authors 
describe how Yahoo and Excite continuously have been transforming their 
strategies and structures to continuously renew their transient competitive 
advantage in response to competition and continuous changes in their 
environment’s needs (Rindova and Kotha 2001). In fact, through this progression, a 
firm as a bundle of resources goes through a life-cycle of birth, growth, and 
maturity till the moment that it finally may die or may be adapted and reconfigured 
into new bundles of resources to answer to the changing needs of its environment 
(assuming a firm is active in a market with only one product) (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). 
     
3.3.4 Strategic Choice and Determinism 
 
Finally, in the defined setting above, the potentiality and infinity of states into 
which a resource bundle can become actualized provide the opportunity (Teece et 
al. 1997) of “strategic choice” (Child 1997) for a resource bundle (mainly an actor). 
In fact, an actor (e.g. managers or entrepreneurs) can be considered as the holder of 
knowledge (mainly as dynamic capabilities) and authority (both formal and 
informal) at individual level who can contribute to the adaptation of an appropriate 
strategy for allocation and “orchestration” of resources (Augier and Teece 2008, 
Augier and Teece 2009). In addition, the role of actors can be addressed in the case 
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of setting and identifying a system objective specially regarding our open system 
perspective as the foundation of our theory. This objective partly delivers the 
intentionality and direction of a firm growth versus a blind biological evolution 
(Augier and Teece 2008, Augier and Teece 2009). However, it is worthy to note 
that as the whole environment is continuously moving and morphing, the objective 
of the system is not necessarily already identified; it can be partly emergent, partly 
planned, and reframed continuously. 
      
At the other side, the configuration of resource bundles (e.g., industry, market) also 
contains a level of determinism (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985). This determinism is 
imposed on the firm due to the actions of the other actors (e.g., competitors within 
the firm industry or market), a lack of necessary resources (e.g., complementary 
resources), and limitation of a firm geographical location, among other reasons 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985). Strategic choice gives the firm the chance to shape its 
environment, while at the same time, it is being shaped by the (potential) 
constraints and opportunities that the environment provides (Augier and Teece 
2008, Augier and Teece 2009). For example, it is expected that the firm can play 
significant role in shaping its environment in cases where the firm (1) is a part of 
monopoly or duopoly, (2) is large in size, (3) has a large market share, or (4) takes a 
central role in its network, ceteris paribus (e.g., Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985). As a 
result, the level and effects of both deterministic (environment) and strategic choice 
dimensions contribute to the new potential states that come into actuality and the 
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ways through which resource bundles may go (Lawless and Finch 1989). This 
interaction is in fact what does not allow a complete pre-planning, creating 
uncertainty and emergent situations that have to be catched and planned upon the 
actuality within a specific context (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997).  
    
Here, we answer the following question that “What will be the characteristics of a 
firm’s growth?” 
 
Regarding the characteristics of growth, it can be observed that the firm goes 
through periods of fast growth followed by periods of slow growth, known as the 
Penrose effect (Penrose 1959). The periods of slow growth can be translated as 
periods of contraction, while the periods of fast growth can be considered 
expansion periods. This can also be considered as change in the growth rate of the 
firm, as (highly) positive growth slopes will be followed by less positive or 
negative ones (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). As mentioned above, the firm will go 
through a path of growth that is partly shaped by the firm itself through its own 
choices (Cockburn et al. 2000, Helfat 1994) and is partly shaped by the 
environment through resource constraints and opportunities provided to the firm 
(Alvarez and Barney 2010, Noda and Collis 2001, Helfat 1994).  
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Under these conditions, the results of different paths of growth, considering 
an initial state of the firm’s resources (Cockburn et al. 2000, Noda and 
Collis 2001, Boeker 1989), may (1) diverge into different sets of 
heterogeneous resource bundles (e.g., different firms, and at other levels of 
analysis products, organizational forms, markets) (Rugman and Verbeke 
2002, Cockburn et al. 2000, Noda and Collis 2001), or (2) converge (Noda 
and Collis 2001) into (semi) similar final states or results, such as (semi) 
similar configurations of resources, products, and services as the equifinality 
of the firms’ destinations (Gresov and Drazin 1997).  
      
Noda and Collis (2001), through a longitudinal study of seven cellular 
phone companies, address this main concern of why firms within an 
industry are heterogeneous. Their findings magnify the roles of three main 
factors: (1) the initial condition of the firms’ resources beside the two (2) 
converging and (3) diverging forces. The initial condition of the firm, such 
as geographical locations and firm initial experiences, has been addressed as 
the basis for the initial direction of the firms’ strategies and actions. This 
initial condition itself has been shaped due to competitive interaction 
between different players in the market, geographic and socioeconomic 
attributes, firm level strategy and the firm ability in shaping its environment 
through its managerial choices.  
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Diverging forces, such as managers’ asymmetrical expectations and local learning, 
and different types of feedbacks received upon firm strategic actions, were among 
the forces pushing firms into creating new directions. At the other side, converging 
forces, such as firms’ imitating activities and strategies, were directing the firms to 
similar paths and final ends. In fact, after the formation of these firms, this has been 
the interplay between these divergence and convergence forces that has shaped the 
paths that the seven companies into which had grown. This interplay, depending on 
the strength of the forces, for instance (1) relying more on the local learning and 
taking innovative actions forced by management as divergence forces versus (2) 
looking at competitors and following their steps as convergence forces, contributed 
to the total amount of variance in the level of heterogeneity between the firms. 
Similarly, in the study of firms in the pharmaceutical industry, Cockburn et al. 
(2000) supports the role of initial conditions and convergence forces (discussed 
above) on the heterogeneity and similarity of firms in the industry.  
       
Based on the discussion above we provide two representative examples from 
studies in strategy literature to support our ideas: 
       
Example 1: Ariño and de la Torre (1998), by studying a Joint Venture (JV) and its 
parent companies from its birth to its death, interestingly address the firm internal 
growth and its growth with its external environment and its parents. The authors 
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explain that the JV (the child), as an independent entity, is formed to introduce a 
new product into the Scandinavian market by bundling the parents’ complementary 
resources. The JV started as a 50/50 equity alliance where it included R&D, 
production, marketing, and distribution of products. After its formation, the JV 
started growing and introduced its products after a period of research and 
production according to its parents’ initial aims. In this initial period, the related 
industries and markets had a moderate level of competition and this opened enough 
level of strategic choice for the JV to introduce its product into pre-identified 
market. The JV introduced two main products including (1) soap and skincare and 
(2) dietary substitute, and it became successful in some of its target markets and its 
product found a dominant position (the market as a part of environment is shaped 
due to the output of the firm). However, some of the products did not succeed in the 
markets and further research and additional formulas from the parents were 
necessary to adapt the product. Over time, due to its endogenous evolution and 
achieving surplus capacity, the JV faced the opportunity to target and expand into 
new markets (e.g., the U.S and Asian market and starting new products).  
      
For these further levels of growth, the JV initiated new strategies (as internal spark 
within the firm) and negotiated for further inputs, such as distribution channels and 
further production formulas from its parents. In some cases, these requests were 
accepted, and the JV found the chance to co-evolve with its parents (e.g., receiving 
new knowledge, shelf sharing and new arrangements between and within the JV 
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and its parents in the U.S. market) and its environment (e.g., entering and achieving 
significant share in the U.S. market). However, in some cases the stated requests 
were rejected (as input constraints), and the JV’s lack of knowledge and need for 
more time to develop the related knowledge (as lack of capacity and time 
compression diseconomies) hindered its growth in these areas. The more the JV 
grew, the more it became complex (e.g. structurally) due to the higher level of 
interdependencies within itself and also with its parents in different activities. 
However, in some cases, due to the internal evolution of parent companies such as 
change in their strategies some of the arrangements shared arrangements were 
stopped and decreased the complexity. After four years, the JV evolved to a point 
that it majorly deviated from its initial objective creating a misfit with its parents’ 
objectives. Thus, the JV dissolved and came to its end.  
      
What can be observed is that after its formation (as its initial condition), the JV 
went through a growth path that firstly was initiated and affected by the initial 
complementary resources and the objectives of its parents. After its formation, we 
can see that both strategic choice and deterministic factors affected the path in 
which the JV grew. Firstly, strategic choices of the JV for example to enter into 
new markets (e.g. the US) or starting new products (e.g. new formulas for its 
detergent) based on its available resources mainly its R&D capabilities and 
distribution channels that helped the JV to partly shape its future by its own hands. 
However, the determinism and constraints on the firm such as constraints on access 
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to necessary resources (e.g., related distribution channels and necessary knowledge, 
and the time needed to develop the related skills) and additional constraints 
imposed by the parents in stopping the JV from entering into shared-interests 
markets hindered the further growth of the firm in those areas. Also, competition 
and barriers to entry in the following stages of the JV growth were among other 
factors that hindered the firm from further expansion into Asian markets as the role 
of environment in partly shaping the future of the JV’s destination.  
      
Example 2: Raff (2000), in his chronological study, shows the growth of Borders’ 
book selling firm in the US context. The author shows how Borders’ brother started 
small bookstores in Michigan with the aim of providing a comprehensive range of 
book to their audiences. These audiences were initially faculties and students in the 
University of Michigan. At early moments, there was a moderate level of 
competition and this provided Border brothers the chance to enter and sell used 
books to these audiences. The study nicely describes the accumulative forms of 
growth in different aspects, such as the range of books and topics sold, and the size 
of the firm (stores, shelves, etc). In addition, it nicely shows how the firm became 
more advanced in different phases (e.g. in 1971 and 1974) in terms of their services 
(discussed in the following) and how the firm’s capabilities helped to reconfigure 
its internal resources in these years, resulting in a higher level of efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
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The stated advances can be seen as the level of internal growth according to its 
available resources (e.g., the progress of title categories due to the accumulation of 
huge number of topics; more advanced and customer-centered services and adding 
guide for customers; etc), and that Borders was able to expand its business due to 
achieving further internal capacity (e.g. surplus financial resources) through 
ongoing opportunities available to the firm (e.g., possibility of acquisition of 
already established stores within their city). In the following stages, enough level 
of growth made it possible for the firm to enter other geographical areas and to 
provide its services at national level. In addition, further growth provided the 
chance to internalize different parts of its value chain. To be able to manage the 
firm and also as an outcome of the firm growth, Borders additionally developed a 
controlling system that was growing back to back of the firm. After 20 years this 
controlling system itself became a unique competitive resource for starting new 
businesses and expansions into new areas and as a source of rent making. 
      
In fact, the study shows that a low level of competition in early years in addition to 
a huge unmet demand, provided an acceptable level of strategic choice for Borders 
to start and grow its business in Michigan. Through the years, Borders found the 
opportunity to internalize different parts of its business (for example, from supply 
to final distribution) and became a national player. In fact, over the years, Borders 
became more and more complex and it went through several periods of transition 
reconfiguring its business. At the other side, considering the role of the 
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environment, the availability of other competitors in other geographical areas did 
not allow the firm to enter into some areas. Also the firm strategy focused on the 
profitable areas and did not aim to enter into others (e.g., university centered cities 
already being serviced by competitors). This interplay between these two forces 
shaped the way Borders grew, however, as we can see in the study, the firm 
strategic choice rather than the environment determinism played a stronger role in 
shaping the firm destiny as a national player.  
      
      
3.4 The Components of the Theory: Some Clarifications 
       
Here, we address how our theory complies with current studies in the strategy and 
organization theory streams. Van de Ven and Poole (1995), in their seminal study, 
provide four main motors of change by reviewing a vast number of studies. We 
note that our theory has overlap with all four motors of change discussed by (Van 
de Ven and Poole 1995), including teleological, life-cycle, dialectical, and 
evolutionary motors. The teleological motor, as open-system perspective, basically 
addresses that the system is in continuous interaction with its outside environment 
to reach an objective (e.g. following values), and it reaches an equifinal state 
through different paths (Gresov and Drazin 1997) similar to what was discussed in 
our theory. In this line, however, the objective of the system is not necessarily 
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already identified; it can be partly emergent, partly planned, and is continuously 
reframed during its growth.  
       
The life-cycle motor (Van de Ven and Poole 1995) addresses the progression of 
resources in their life cycles in addition to the adaptation of resource bundles to 
their environment in the process. Similar to our theory, resources on their own 
progress (and have a tendency) toward different (more) complex states (e.g., a more 
transcendent state), and through this progression, they can go through a cycle of 
birth, growth, maturity and afterward may die or revitalize into more complex new 
resource bundles. The possibility of strategic choices gives the ability of dynamic 
adaptation and the ability of resource bundles to shape their environment. The 
evolutionary motor (Van de Ven and Poole 1995) addresses the natural selection of 
the fittest imposed over a (group of) firm(s) by the environment. Our theory, 
considering the determinism imposed on the firm (discussed above) (Hrebiniak and 
Joyce 1985, Lawless and Finch 1989), addresses the role of the environment in 
shaping the firm condition in the way that a series of resource bundles (e.g., firms, 
departments) may give birth, survive (and be enforced), or may be selected out. In 
fact, the initial condition of a firm as the first form of determinism (e.g., where a 
firm geographically emerges at first hand) and the determinism imposed on the firm 
due to competition and resource scarcity address the way that selection mechanisms 
may act. However, in this condition, managerial strategies such as positional 
strategies can somehow neutralize these selection mechanisms and raise the idea of 
 60 
adaption versus blind environmental selection (Barnett et al. 1994). 
       
The last motor, the dialectal motor, basically discusses the conflict of interests 
between thesis and anti-thesis that results in the emergence of a synthesis (Van de 
Ven and Poole 1995). Although we did not address this idea directly in our theory, 
but it embodies this dialectical motor as one of main ways that movement unfolds. 
For instance, a synthesis (e.g., as a spark) can be considered a new bundle of 
resources (e.g., as an idea) that comes to actuality due to the interaction of thesis 
and anti-thesis (as bundles of resources) due to the internal conflict of conscious 
actors (specifically at the individual level) (Grant 1996).  
      
Finally, the resource-based theory provided here has the characteristics of a 
potential resource-based theory of strategy addressed by Porter in 1991. First, we 
have provided the related change mechanisms that unfold through a path-dependent 
progression to answer (1) the static problem (explaining the change mechanisms) 
and (2) the problem of causality in RBT (the link between actual and potential 
states). Additionally, our discussions cover the other stated criteria by Porter (1991) 
mainly addressing (1) both internal and external conditions of the firm (our 
clarification about strategic choice and determinism), (2) the continuous change of 
the environment (the whole space of continuously moving and evolving resources 
excluding the effect of the firm), and (3) the role of the firm in shaping its 
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environment (discussed directly in section 3.3.4). 
      
     
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
       
Resource-based theory can be considered one of the main influential research 
programs (Lockett et al. 2008) in strategy stream since the seminal work by Penrose 
(1959). The theory mainly aimed to determine the value of a firms’ internal 
resources (Wernerfelt 1984, Peteraf 1993, Barney 1991, Conner 1991) at a time 
when theories were valuing a firm’s external condition on its above-average 
financial returns (or rents). Barney (1991) mainly assumes the existence of a series 
of heterogeneous firms as the foundation of RBT and that those firms having 
resources with four VRIN attributes have the chance to make abnormal return 
(rents). Following the studies on RBT, dynamic capabilities (while themselves can 
be considered as bundles of resources) were introduced as the reconfiguration 
engines of resources to keep the fit level of a firm with its changing environment 
(Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Despite of these advances, Barney 
et al. (2011) ask for the revitalization of the RBT through the discussion about more 
elaborate change mechanisms and for an inherent dynamism in the theory. In fact, 
the main question is how resources have got to the point that are VRIN. 
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To address this need, we provided a new configuration of RBT by settling it down 
in the open-system (teleological) perspective (Van de Ven and Poole 1995). We 
considered the movement as the cause of formation of resources and considered a 
firm as a (sub) bundle of moving resources as a sub-set of a larger space of moving 
resources (the environment) morphing toward an objective. Following that, we 
discussed how the firm (as a bundle of resources) grows and transforms 
continuously toward its objective, as the outcome of this growth. We discussed 
strategic choice and determinism as two fundamental forces contributing to where 
firms will go and how firms shape their destinies and their environment while at the 
same time are being shaped by their environment. Finally, we concluded our 
discussion by addressing the characteristics of a firm’s growth and the nature of 
firm heterogeneity.  
     
Our theory introduces some new aspects that can become a basis for further 
empirical studies in the field. First, the dynamic approach and the settlement of the 
RBT in the body of the open-system perspective can be considered as one of the 
most unique contributions. That is how a firm, as a bundle of resources, grows 
through both its internal growth and additionally interaction with its external 
environment due to the movement. This in fact gives that dynamic nature to RBT as 
the missing part of the theory and brings DCs at the heart of the theory. In addition, 
our framework, through discussion about strategic choice and determinism 
addresses how a firm has the chance to partly shape its destiny and its environment 
   
 
63 
versus blind natural selection approaches. Finally, our theory opens up a way for 
researchers to have a micro and elaborate approach to RBT (noted by Barney et al. 
2011) and dynamic capability research programs for further studies.  
 
As we considered a firm as a bundle of resources, the provided theory can be 
considered in a more general term as an initial step to “a theory of resource 
bundles”. It can be adapted and tested in all sets of tangible and intangible resource 
bundles from individuals, departments, and firms to processes, knowledge, and 
science, to industries and societies, and at a very abstract level, concepts and 
phenomena. This flexibility also can partly answer the need in the strategy literature 
to study change and evolution at different macro, micro, and meso levels of analysis 
(e.g., Pettigrew et al. 2001). In the end, our theorization gives readers the ability to 
examine and place infinite pieces of reality next to each other and formulate a better 
understanding about one moving reality (as a whole) that is continuously renewing 
itself.  
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Chapter 4 
Unfolding Airbus’ Strategic Growth: A Case Study 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
Conducting a process-based case study, we present the successful growth of the 
Airbus consortium over 20 years, answering the question ‘how do firms grow 
sustainably?’ in the context of a dynamic technology-intensive industry. The study 
magnifies the underlying role of (1) the incremental and piecemeal accumulation of 
assets plus (2) commonalities on the Airbus sustainable growth over the period. The 
growth is achieved through three cycles of new product development over the 20 
years of Airbus’ life. In addition, our results show two primary periods of growth 
for Airbus: (1) consolidation, when Airbus was formed and became established as a 
consortium in parallel with its first aircraft, and (2) technological advance, when 
Airbus explored the technological capabilities of its partners and became a pioneer 
in the commercial aircraft industry in terms of technological advances.  
 
 
 
  
 66 
4.2 Introduction 
 
Over the previous decades, the question of how firms grow sustainably has been at 
the center of strategic management research (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993, Dierickx 
and Cool 1989). Studies from the resource-based school have provided the 
dominant views addressing the sustainability of firm growth (Penrose 1959). These 
studies first address firms’ strategic and unique assets as a source of competitive 
advantage (Barney 1991, Dierickx and Cool 1989). Second, they emphasize the role 
of isolating mechanisms in the sustainability of competitive advantage (Barney 
1991, Peteraf 1993). However, the question of sustainability becomes particularly 
crucial in the case of dynamic environments (e.g., high velocity industries) in which 
firms face a high level of uncertainty (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Wirtz et al. 
2007). Uncertainty basically encompasses potential and unknown events such as 
rapid technological changes, shorter business cycles, or shocks that make firms 
unable to predict and act ex ante. Unpredictable events undermine firm strategic 
assets and render them a misfit to their environment (Helfat et al. 2007). As a result, 
firms must look for ways to accumulate new strategic assets and change (Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000).  
 
To respond to the uncertainty of dynamic environments, studies from the dynamic 
capability perspective address the role of dynamic capabilities in adding and 
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reconfiguring resources and, as a result, in the sustainability of firm growth (Teece 
et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). These capabilities are considered to be 
processes or capacities (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) that allow 
the firm to purposefully change their resource base (Helfat et al. 2007) to maintain 
their transient competitive advantage and experience sustainable growth over time 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Rindova and Kotha 2001). In this line, firms’ R&D 
capabilities to develop new technologies and new products, especially, have been 
identified and discussed as one of the primary driving forces behind changing 
resources and the growth of firms (Danneels 2002, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, 
Schilke 2014a, Leonard-Barton 1992). These capabilities, in fact, help the firm to 
continuously develop and improve its technologies and products when product life 
cycles become shorter, technologies advance rapidly, or there is intense competition 
in the environment (Helfat et al. 2007).  
 
Reviewing the literature, despite the relevance of strategic asset accumulation as a 
source of competitive advantage and firm sustainable growth (Dierickx and Cool 
1989) and the role of firm (e.g. R&D) dynamic capabilities in changing firm assets 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000), empirical studies extending and supporting how 
strategic assets are accumulated and how capabilities contribute to this 
accumulation are scarce. In addition, since we are interested in the “how” of firm 
growth, the relevant empirical studies are essentially case studies or qualitative in 
general (Van de Ven and Poole 2005) and previous studies have emphasized on the 
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necessity of such method in the literature (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009, Helfat et 
al. 2007, Easterby‐Smith et al. 2009, Danneels 2011).  
 
Prior empirical studies (“how” questions), especially those with a focus on new 
product development, for instance, have supported the underlying role of processes 
such as the addition and modification of firm capabilities, through which firms 
change their resource base (Danneels 2011). Alternatively, these studies have 
empirically demonstrated how firm capabilities are developed in interaction with 
their new product development processes (Danneels 2002, Prašnikar et al. 2008, 
Narayanan et al. 2009). However, available studies primarily emphasize change 
during the period of firm decline (Danneels 2011, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, 
Langlois and Steinmueller 2000), while studies on the growth period in the case of 
large firms are rare. Last but not least, despite its importance, the commercial 
aircraft industry has been neglected as a study context to date.  
 
Analyzing the successful case of the Airbus consortium as a pioneer in the 
commercial aviation (aircraft) industry, we present and theorize about a case of 
sustainable growth, drawing on the Asset Accumulation Theory (AAT) by Dierickx 
and Cool (1989) and Dynamic Capabilities (DCs) by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). 
We present how the Airbus consortium was sparked as a joint partnership between 
France, Britain, and Germany in 1967 and how, by 1987, it had become a pioneer in 
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the commercial aviation industry through its technological advances. The study 
presents “how”, among other possible ways, firms can sustainably grow by 
providing a cyclical process-based model of new product development as the basis 
for firm asset accumulation. Our findings magnify the role of two core factors in the 
sustainable growth of Airbus: (1) the incremental and piecemeal accumulation of 
strategic assets that contribute to Airbus’ competitive advantages and (2) the 
centrality of the ‘maximum commonality’ strategy in this asset accumulation. This 
growth represents the progression of Airbus in terms of technology, credibility, and 
its development of various types of aircraft over the period of study. Additionally, 
we identify two primary periods of growth for Airbus: (1) consolidation, when 
Airbus was formed and became established as independent entity and (2) 
technological advance, when Airbus explored the technological capabilities of its 
partners to a greater level.  
 
This study contributes to the strategic growth literature by empirically extending the 
asset accumulation theory and to dynamic capabilities in the context of a dynamic 
industry. Our study complements the previous studies in the literature by providing 
a more complete picture of how dynamic capabilities function and, more 
importantly, how firms accumulate resources that result in their sustainable growth 
over time. In the following, first, we present a model of firm sustainable growth. 
Next, we comment on the method and the data collected for the study. Then we 
present the growth of Airbus using an analytic description and theorizing about the 
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events through which Airbus developed over time. Finally, we provide the findings 
of confronting analysis and end the study with our concluding remarks.  
 
 
4.3 A Model of Sustainable Growth 
 
We center our study on the AAT by Dierickx and Cool (1989) and the DCs by 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000). We define growth as an accumulation of assets that 
results in an increase in size and/or an improvement in the nature of firm assets. 
Dierickx and Cool (1998), addressing the sustainability of firm competitive 
advantage, suggest that strategic assets such as capabilities, technologies, or 
reputation should be built and accumulated over time because they may not be 
available and cannot be bought (Dierickx and Cool 1989) in the “strategic factor 
market” (Barney 1986). These ongoing built and accumulated assets are central to 
the firm’s competitive advantage and are basically the source of sustainable rent 
creation within the firm. What makes these resources special and the source of 
competitive advantage is the unique way in which they are built and accumulated 
over time (Dierickx and Cool 1989). The uniqueness and specially the time required 
for accumulation make the imitation of assets by competitors very difficult or 
sometimes impossible, giving the firm the chance to sustainably maintain and 
continue its growth (Teece 2000). However, the accumulation and sustainability of 
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assets becomes critical in the case of a dynamic environment with a high level of 
uncertainty and frequent technological change (Dierickx and Cool 1989).  
 
In dynamic environments, firms need to accumulate assets to respond to the 
changing needs of their environment (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). We discuss the 
role of dynamic capabilities, which are central to the accumulation of assets in 
dynamic environments and when there is need for change. DCs are firm capacities 
and processes that allow it to purposefully reconfigure its resource base (Helfat et 
al. 2007) and maintain its transient competitive advantage in response to the 
changing needs of its dynamic environment (Rindova and Kotha 2001). As a result, 
DCs allow the firm to change the nature of the current stock of assets and develop a 
new nature and direction. These capabilities can be divided into two groups: 
second-order and first-order capabilities (Winter 2003, Schilke 2014b). First-order 
capabilities help the firm to ‘make a living’ through its daily activities (Winter 
2003), while second-order capabilities are of a higher order and are used to 
reconfigure the remaining lower-order capabilities and firm resources (Schilke 
2014a, Danneels 2002, Schilke 2014b). In the case of dynamic technology-intensive 
industries, firms’ R&D capabilities have been discussed and supported as second-
order capabilities that primarily contribute to the reconfiguration of resources 
(Schilke 2014a, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Danneels 2002, Leonard-Barton 
1992). In fact, R&D capabilities allow the firm to accumulate new technological 
resources and to introduce new technologies and products based on the changing 
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nature of the environment (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Schilke 2014a, Schilke 
2014b) to serve as a basis of firm sustainable growth.  
 
Drawing on the two theories, we propose a process-based model as the basis for 
firm sustainable growth in dynamic technology-intensive industries with a focus on 
new product (e.g., aircraft) development (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Consider an R&D-based firm in a dynamic technology-intensive industry in which 
the firm’s growth and survival are highly dependent on the firm’s ability to change 
and to continuously accumulate new resources (e.g., Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). 
In such contexts, in accordance with prior studies, new product development is one 
of the main drivers of firm asset accumulation (e.g., Danneels 2002; Eisenhart and 
Martin 2000; Schilke 2014a). A new product and its underlying technologies 
become actualized after a period of research, design, and testing considering the 
needs of the environment, the firm objective, or the interaction between the two 
(Danneels 2002). For instance, as a potential result of resource bundles, a final 
product (named A) with an initial level of complexity, purposefully comes into 
actuality based on the initial stock of resources (initial technologies, physical assets, 
etc.) (Dierickx and Cool 1989), the firm’s R&D capabilities, the activities 
performed to design/create the product (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), and finally, 
the resources entering the firm as inputs such as raw materials and technological 
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inputs (Dierickx and Cool 1989). The new product and the accumulated assets 
contribute to the firm’s competitive advantage and its financial performance. 
 
At this point, by completing a cycle of new product development and introduction, 
the firm has moved from its initial level of asset stocks and has added a new level 
of asset stocks. However, the journey has just started. If in the previous cycle, the 
firm has been able to meet its objective at a satisficing level, it needs to enter a new 
cycle and develop new technological advancements and products to address the 
dynamic nature of its environment (e.g., new market needs, new technologies, 
economic shocks) (Danneels 2002, Schilke 2014a). As a result, based on its current 
stock of strategic assets (product A and its related technological advances), R&D 
activities (Danneels 2002) and (new) inputs, the firm has the opportunity to 
introduce new technological advances and product(s) (named B) with a more 
complex and improved nature (Schoemaker 1990).  
 
The sustainability of growth centers on a cycle in which, after the introduction of 
the first product, the firm continuously accumulate and develop asset stocks. In 
each cycle, the unique accumulated resources (stocks) become a foundation that the 
firm, through its dynamic R&D capabilities, can capitalize on for its next level of 
growth and new advancements (Henderson and Cockburn 1994, Helfat 1997). 
However, there is a maximum growth rate to the process (Penrose 1959) due to the 
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time required for the internal accumulation of the necessary stocks, their 
unavailability in the strategic factor market (Dierickx and Cool 1989), or property 
rights restrictions (Barney 1991). Assuming that the firm evolves around its new 
products, the different bundles of resources embedded within the firm (e.g., 
technological base, products, processes) change to maintain the firm’s fit with its 
environment (Rindova and Kotha 2001) (See Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 A Cyclical Model of Resource Accumulation 
 
To support our model, we next comment on the context, method, and data used for 
the study. 
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4.4 Research Method  
 
For this study, we chose the commercial aircraft industry because of its dynamic 
nature. The uncertainty in this industry is the result of continuous innovation, 
technological advances, competition between large players, and various types of 
shocks (e.g., economic shocks). Technological advances and new product 
development are, in fact, the key to growth in this industry, and aircraft producers 
are very representative of the model in the previous section. These firms need to 
innovate and advance continuously to address the various forms of uncertainty in 
their environment, and these firms mostly develop and grow around their new 
aircraft. Given the enormous investments required to develop and build new 
technologies and aircraft in the commercial aircraft industry, alliances are frequent 
and are key to growth among the players (Garrette et al. 2009). Additionally, the 
commercial aircraft industry has been less studied and explored despite its market 
share and importance in the management area. 
 
In our study, Airbus was selected first because the case fit well with our theoretical 
model and the aim of studying sustainable firm growth with a focus on new product 
development (Yin 2003). Second, Airbus is a representative and impressive case of 
successful growth, with over 50 percent market share. Extreme cases can provide a 
richer context for realizing and specifying underlying processes or relationships 
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(Yin 2003). In addition, regarding the bold success of Airbus, a satisficing level of 
representative subjective and objective data and documents are available describing 
the journey of Airbus over the last four decades (Yin 2003). However, because the 
study was concentrated on the initial stage of Airbus growth as the unexplored part 
of the literature, we selected the initial 20 years of Airbus growth, from when it was 
formed between France, Britain, and Germany until the moment that it became a 
pioneer in the industry in terms of technological advances in 1987. 
 
To support the study model regarding the “how” of firm growth, we drew on 
process-based case studies (Van de Ven 1992) based on narratives (Pentland 1999). 
In this regard, first, process is understood as “the sequences of incidents, activities, 
and stages ‘[events in general]’ that unfold over the duration of a central subject’s 
existence” (Van de Ven 1992). Second, these are stories that describe and create 
connections between sequences of events. In fact, stories help a researcher to 
understand a context, make sense of the relationships between events, and develop 
plausible explanations for the nature of phenomena (Pentland 1999). Stories 
therefore do more than just mirror phenomena as a sequence of events, but at a 
deeper level, they move “from description to explanation” (Pentland 1999) and help 
to capture the complexity of processes and reveal the underlying patterns producing 
a specific result (e.g., sustainable growth) (Van de Ven and Poole 1995). However, 
it is worth mentioning that precise and coherent data are a necessary base for a good 
academic story.  
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To develop the Airbus story, we collected substantial amounts of data including (1) 
original available public data from the Airbus website (reports, recorded interviews, 
and a history of Airbus), (2) news, (3) documentaries, and (4) scholarly papers and 
cases studies already conducted on Airbus. These sources provided us with a rich 
pool of both objective (e.g., data on aircraft, technologies, orders, and deliveries) 
and subjective (e.g., reports and available interviews) data for our study. After the 
first round of data collection, we followed a snowball approach and looked for 
additional references within the data. For instance, in the case of documentaries and 
scholarly articles, we traced additional references addressed or cited to complement 
or cross-check our data.  
 
After the two rounds of data collection described above, we identified all of the 
events, activities, and stages in a timeline that together describe (form) the growth 
of Airbus over the period of study (see Table 4.1) (Van de Ven 1992). According to 
the identified events, we started analyzing our data and writing the story of Airbus 
in chronological order (Pentland 1999). While writing the story, in some areas we 
faced voids in the data that pushed us to collect new details and increase the depth 
of the data around those specific events, particularly in the case of new 
technological advances and types of aircraft. To enforce the reliability of the data 
and analysis, we cross-checked the different sources of data available to us for each 
event.  
 78 
Year Internal Events/Forces Environmental Events/Forces 
1967 Initial agreement is reached between the French and German 
economic ministers, sparking the start of a new project. 
  
A meeting occurs between Germany, France, and Britain. A 
memorandum is signed between the countries to initiate the A300 
aircraft. 
  
Initial planning and design of the A300 begins.  Collaborates with Lufthansa and Air France  
to design the A300. 
1968    Limitations to input:  Rolls-Royce declines to  
produce the BR207 for Airbus. 
External pressures: Pressure emerges regarding the  
viability of the A300 as two-engine 300 seat aircraft. 
Internal Change: A change in the design of the A300  
leads to a new aircraft called the A300B. 
  
1969 Alliance formalization: The formal contract to launch the A300B 
is signed. 
  
A Separation: The British Government separates from the 
partnership because of the deviation of the A300B from the A300 
and other internal plans. 
 
Alliance recovery: The German party and Hawker Siddelly [a 
British partner] substitute for the British Government.  
 
The partners’ stake changes. 
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1970 Legalization: Consortium is legally registered as GIE  
(Airbus Industrie). 
Airbus becomes an independent entity. 
Initial orders: Air France places 10 orders for the A300B. 
1971 Spain joins the consortium with a 4.2 percent stake.   
1972 The A300B completes its successful first flight.   
    Lufthansa places its first order (3 orders). 
1974  Korean Airlines places its first order (4 orders). 
South Africa places its first order (4 orders). 
Air Inter places its first order (3 orders). 
1975 First A300B delivery to Air France (6 aircraft) Indian Airlines places order. 
1977 Obtains "ETOPS" permission for the A300B 
 (permission for long-distance trips). 
Introduces CatIIIA Autoland Technology. 
The 40th A300 is delivered. 
Thai Airline places first order (2 orders). 
1978 New Aircraft: Launches the A310, a short-range  
aircraft with 200 seats. 
 
A Return: The British government returns to the  
alliance, obtaining 20 percent of the consortium. 
 
New technological investments are made. 
East Airlines places 23 orders for the A300 (March 1978). 
 
The need for small aircraft becomes apparent. 
 
SwissAir places order for the A310. 
 
Air France and Iberia place order for the A310. 
1979   The Oil Crisis occurs, starting the economic recession. 
An increasing need appears for low-cost and efficient aircraft. 
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1981 Announces decision to build the A320 with 150 seats.   
  Receives new orders for the planned A320. 
1982 Introduces a new cockpit for the A310.   
1983 Uses composites in the secondary structure of the A310.   
1984 The A320 is officially launched.   
1985 Composite is used in the primary structure of the A310.   
1987 The A320 completes its first flight. 
Introduces Fly-By-Wire.  
  
 
Table 4.1 Table of Events 
 
Having finished the story, we worked to confront and extend (Danneels 2011) the 
theoretical model (basically its constructs and the relationship between them) and 
the data. We first benefited from the literature to identify the already tested 
construct indicators in our theoretical model, especially in the case of R&D 
capabilities (see Table 4.2). This review provided a tangible understanding of the 
indicators and improved the validity of our analysis. Afterwards, we carefully 
checked what the data and the context represented about the model constructs. For 
instance, in the commercial aircraft industry, each order has significance. Because 
commercial aircraft carry people with a high level of risk, there are strict standards 
and requirements for aircraft and aircraft producers. Each new aircraft must 
   
 
81 
experience various tests under varied conditions (e.g., cold weather, hot weather, 
storms); these tests may take more than two thousand hours of flight for a new 
aircraft. As a result, orders can be considered to be a strong indicator of a reliable 
aircraft and aircraft producer. In the case of technological assets, the advanced 
technologies had an objective nature (the number and models) and they were 
representative of Airbus’ technological growth during this period. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that the objective nature of the data helped us to minimize any 
bias that could arise in the case of subjective analysis and improved both the 
validity and the reliability of our analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Capability Indicators 
R&D Capabilities (focus on new product development) Data 
 
Introduce new generation of products (Schilke 2014) 
 
 
 
Extend product range (Schilke 2014) 
Enter new technological field (Schilke 2014) 
 
Identify promising new technologies (Danneels 2008) 
 
Developing the most efficient and economic  
aircraft in the industry  
Producing a product not only comparable to the current 
products but a level beyond them 
Extending the family of aircraft 
Pushing the boundaries of technological advances one 
step forward  
Looking for new engine design 
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After identifying the indicators, we confronted the theoretical model with the story. 
The theoretical model allowed us to focus and avoid major deviations from the 
objective of study (Yin 2003). However, although we were primarily focused on the 
theoretical model of study, in parallel, we considered any novel insights 
independently provided by the data. We were then able to capture or rule out the 
role of events and factors except for those identified according to the theoretical 
model to ensure the associations between events. After finishing this stage, once the 
result of this analysis was available, we could move to a higher level of abstraction 
and look for the underlying pattern of Airbus growth as it contributed to sustainable 
growth, addressing the primary question of our study. In this process, the qualitative 
nature of analysis pushed us to go back and forth between the data and the 
advancing theory in two levels of abstraction to develop a satisfactory version of 
the article. Finally, once the article was finished, we left it untouched for three 
weeks twice, and after these two gaps, all of the authors independently reviewed the 
article one more time and, through discussions, finalized the study. 
 
 
4.5 Data Analysis  
 
In the following, we divide the strategic growth of Airbus into two primary periods: 
(1) airbus spark and establishment (1967-1977) and (2) technological advancement 
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and consortium enforcement (1977-1987). Regarding the focus of our study in 
relation to the strategic growth of Airbus and its technological advances (please see 
Figure 4.1), we identified three core assets of Airbus and focused on the growth of 
these assets over time, including (1) partnership between parties, (2) the technology 
developed between partners, and (3) credibility. However, it is worth noting that 
when necessary, we addressed the role of other factors in the chronological growth 
of Airbus.  
 
4.5.1 Period 1: Airbus Spark and Establishment (1967-1977) 
 
Flight was one of the very first dreams of humans: the initial sketches and hand-
made wings by da Vinci in 17th century take us to the first short flight by the 
Wright brothers’ initial aircraft in 1903 and then to the growth of various forms of 
aircraft over the next decade in Europe and the United States. Starting in 1913, the 
aircraft industry flourished and continued its growth until the 1960s, when the US 
companies became the pioneers of the commercial aircraft industry. US firms had 
the majority of the market share and, in addition, benefited from over 50 years of 
uninterrupted experience and advancement. European aviation companies, however, 
had been affected by World War II and remained behind and dependent upon their 
American counterparts in terms of technological advances until the end of the 
1960s. However, during the 1960s, the idea of Airbus as a potential player in the 
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commercial aviation industry came to life—a player that 30 years later became a 
pioneer in the commercial aviation industry and that delivered more than 1000 
aircraft over five continents. In the following, we provide the analytic story of 
Airbus in its first 20 years of life: 
 
Collaboration as the basis of Airbus: Before the 1960s, European aviation 
companies were doing business at a national level. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
these companies introduced new generations of commercial aircraft such as the 
Comet (English) and the Concorde (French & British supersonic aircraft). 
However, these products competed, and further, none had the potential to take a 
strong position in the market against American aircraft. In fact, it was unlikely that 
any of these companies alone could gain a strong position due to (1) the enormous 
R&D costs of such projects; (2) the lack of resource stocks comparable to 60 years 
of American experience, which were necessary for the development of technologies 
and products at a comparable level and in a timely manner; (3) the high risk of 
failure for such projects; and (4) competition between them within their market. As 
a result, the ambitious aim of being a pioneer in the commercial aviation industry 
that would “voo the whole world and will go over all continents” (Airbus website) 
sparked the idea of Airbus as a joint partnership between the French transport 
minister Jean Chamant and the German economic minister Karl Schiller in 1967 at 
the Paris Air Show. The Europeans were aware of the following truth:  
 
   
 
85 
“without a joint programme of aircraft development and production, Europe would 
be left trailing in the wake of the Americans, who dominated the industry – and, 
with the planned long-range 747 “jumbo” on the horizon, looked set to consolidate 
their supremacy”(Airbus Website). 
 
Signing the Collaboration Memorandum: This initial spark brought the three 
European countries, France, Britain, and Germany, together a few months later in 
September 1967 to sign a memorandum of understanding for the development of 
the A300, a short-to-medium range twin-engine aircraft, as the first phase of their 
collaboration. In fact, nothing could better fit the situation than a joint partnership 
to develop a new generation of aircraft that could satisfy the need for more 
economical and low-cost aircraft, which was the primary demand of the market in 
the late 1960s. The countries tried to ignore their national barriers and come 
together as a united body to benefit from the maximum level of each country’s 
capabilities and expertise and to develop and build the most advanced and 
economical aircraft in their industry. In addition, they were seeking to become 
independent of their American partners; this dependence had limited their growth. 
Therefore,  
 
Airbus was sparked “for the purpose of strengthening European cooperation in the 
field of aviation technology and thereby promoting economic and technological 
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progress in Europe, to take appropriate measures for the joint development and 
production of an airbus” (Airbus Website). 
 
In this process, France and Britain each took 37.5 percent and Germany took 25 
percent of the work for the development of the aircraft. The French “Sud Aviation” 
took the role of “lead company” to coordinate activities between the different 
partners, and English was used as the partnership language. To run the program, 
they were expecting to establish a legal entity (called “Airbus Industrie” as “Groupe 
d’Interet Economique” (GIE), under French law) to create commitment and hold all 
responsible for the corporation. This step was important to allow the partners to 
benefit from their complementary resources and to avoid any clashes in their 
activities. In fact, relying on only their agreements and a mere relationship would 
be problematic in the long term because each party wanted to change and direct the 
plan according to its own interest. With Airbus Industrie setting the necessary 
strategies and providing direction to the partners, potential problems were mitigated 
and strategy development was placed in the hands of a single entity.  
 
Facing Criticism: In 1967, after conducting the necessary initial planning, Airbus 
started developing its very first aircraft and took the bold move of designing a 300-
seat, two-engine aircraft called the A300. This project was bold because at that 
time, an aircraft of that size and with those characteristics for long distances would 
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have at least three engines (in comparison to a US version with a similar size). 
Airbus was in close collaboration with its partners and two dominant airlines, Air 
France and Lufthansa, to develop the aircraft. However, its partners and 
collaborating airlines doubted whether this aircraft would even be possible, which 
put pressure on the entire collaboration. To address the criticisms, Airbus was 
searching for a more powerful engine with more thrust. Airbus negotiated with 
Rolls-Royce to design and deliver an engine with the necessary requirements, 
named the RB207 model. However, Rolls-Royce was engaged with a more 
appealing order (the RB211, an engine with less thrust for an American company), 
and stopped the RB207 project. This event increased criticism of the A300 because 
Airbus no longer even had the necessary engine.  
 
Finally, the criticism pushed Airbus to modify its early plan and shift to a smaller-
size 250 seat aircraft (A300B) that could fly with the current Rolls-Royce engine 
(RB211). This change mitigated concerns over the viability of the aircraft and 
proved to be beneficial for Airbus in the subsequent years. First, because of a 
worldwide economic recession in the late 1960s, airlines were revising their 
forecasts regarding passenger numbers and were looking for smaller aircraft. The 
A300 with 300 seats could have faced problems in the market. In addition, 
developing a smaller aircraft had a lower risk of failure because of the lower level 
of investment and complexity in the aircraft’s development. Finally, Airbus could 
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adapt the smaller RB211 Rolls-Royce engine and could therefore buy the engine off 
the shelf, significantly decreasing the cost of the aircraft. 
 
Launching the A300B Program & Exploring the Technological Potential of a 
Consortium: After these initial developments and after determining that the A300B 
would be the first aircraft of the joint partnership, on 29 May 1969 during the Paris 
Air Show, the three countries finally signed the contract for the Airbus consortium 
for building the A300B, a short-to-medium range twin-engine aircraft. However, 
the consortium did not become a legal entity until 1971. Following the 1969 
contract, the program was launched at the Sud Aviation site in Toulouse, and the 
tasks of the different partners were identified.  
 
To build a product not only comparable to current aircrafts in the market but also a 
level beyond them, Airbus needed to rely heavily on the technological capabilities 
of its partners. In fact, the parties were interested in pushing the boundaries of 
advancements in aircraft rather than just bringing similar products to market. The 
initial idea behind forming Airbus was to benefit and leverage the expertise and 
knowledge of the partners and, beyond, to use their synergies for further 
technological advancements. Béteille, one of the fathers of Airbus, mentions that 
they had to collect and combine all of the technological capabilities of their 
partners. This collaboration could provide a great advantage because over the years, 
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each of these partners based on different forms of education had been able to 
develop unique technological capabilities to contribute to the aircraft. In addition, 
Béteille mentions that they had to take greater risks because they wanted to 
introduce a significant new product that would revolutionize the commercial 
aviation industry.  
 
The tasks were allocated according to the resource base and the technological 
capabilities of each partner. "French took the cockpit, the control systems and the 
lower center section of the fuselage. Hawker Siddeley [the British partner], would 
make the wings while the Germans would make the forward and rear fuselage 
sections, plus the upper part of the center section" (Airbus website). In fact, it was 
very important for the partnership to first allocate the tasks to create coherence 
between parties and avoid redundancies in the project. 
 
A Separation: Despite the changes in the aircraft specifications, there were still 
pressures on the young Airbus partnership regarding the viability of the aircraft. 
The British were also engaged in a national aircraft development that was limiting 
its ability to contribute further resources to Airbus. In all, the environmental 
pressure plus the deviation of the A300 from its early specifications led Britain to 
separate from the partnership on 10 April 1969 and withdraw all of the resources it 
had allocated to the A300. This withdrawal was a significant breakdown that placed 
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the entire partnership under threat of shut down and created a void in the 
consortium’s resource base. Making this problem more critical, Airbus was still not 
stable and was still taking shape as a young partnership. This separation added to 
the current difficulties of Airbus, primarily revolving around managing the 
partnership, the continuous coordination between partners, problems related to 
product development such as the capability-based coordination of the A300 and 
input problems, primarily the lack of engine. In fact, the partnership was virtually 
abandoned during this period (Muller, 1997). 
  
Alliance Recovery: West Germany had anticipated such a separation stepped in, 
offering to support up to 50 percent of the program if the French would do the 
same. The Germans considered Airbus as a great opportunity to rebuild the 
European commercial aviation industry, which had been affected by World War II. 
The fast response of Germany stopped a serious crisis and saved the partnership. In 
addition, despite the withdrawal of Britain, the British company [Hawker Siddeley] 
stepped in and supported the A300B with 35 million pounds for the design of 
wings. However, there was still a need for an additional 35 million, which again 
Germany supported with a loan. 
 
A300B Development and Taking an Initial Shape: To develop the A300B, in the 
early months, Airbus worked closely with its potential customers, primarily Air 
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France and Lufthansa, to develop a product that would fit the needs of its 
customers. To achieve this goal, they developed a system of listening to their 
customers that helped them to keep their aircraft appropriate for the market. In this 
regard, Beteille says, “I wanted to try to understand what the customers really 
wanted”. Additionally, Airbus was determined to not to lose sight of the central 
picture of economic efficiency and being the builder of “the most economical 
aircraft”. In terms of the engine problem, they finally adapted an engine from 
General Electric (CF6-50A- American engine) that they planned to produce jointly 
with a French company called Snecma. The engine was equivalent in function to 
other products (primarily those from Rolls-Royce), but it was more economical, 
addressing the primary aim of Airbus to develop the most economical aircraft. As 
additional new developments, composite-based components were contributing to 
the efficiency and the light weight of the aircraft. While the components of the 
A300 were coming together and the aircraft was taking its initial shape, at a higher 
level, Airbus itself was taking shape around its initial aircraft. In fact, a high 
technology consortium with one unique product was being developed through the 
interaction between the partners’ resources and the emerging aircraft. Through this 
interaction, little by little, the parties were obtaining a better understanding of their 
own roles and contribution to the aircraft.  
 
It is interesting that while Airbus was realizing its initial form, the Airbus “fathers” 
(Beteille & Kracht) were also considering the development of a family of aircraft as 
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“the future” of Airbus that would cover all sectors. At that time, they had a very 
firm vision of eventually gaining 30 percent market share.   
 
First order: On 3 September 1970, Air France signed the first order for six 
upcoming A300s (250-seat aircraft). This success reinforced the partnership’s 
determination to develop the aircraft, which was expected to become an actual 
product in 2 years. In addition, the order helped Airbus to gain a minimum level of 
credibility as an aircraft builder and to justify the investments in the A300 that had 
been criticized by partners and by the market. Further, these orders helped Airbus to 
little by little expand its position in the market and start accumulating credibility, 
one of the strategic assets that contributed to its growth.  
 
Formalization and the Growth of the Consortium: The consortium finally became 
a formal entity on 18 December 1970, when ‘Airbus Industrie’ was registered 
legally under French Law. France Aerospatiale and Germany's Deutsche Airbus 
each took a 50 percent stake. This event had several impacts on the growth of 
Airbus. First, it helped the consortium to unite itself and to establish a single 
interface for the A300 strategy through design, development, flight-testing, sales, 
and marketing. Second, from the earliest moment, it was very important for Airbus 
to be independent. In fact, the collaboration would be in danger without 
independence because it was likely that each partner might want to advance its own 
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interests in, for example, the selection of aircraft type, the capability-based 
allocation of resources, or the expansion strategies of Airbus. The legal registration 
of ‘Airbus Industrie’ helped to separate Airbus from its partners and make it an 
independent entity with economic objectives.  
 
In addition, Airbus Industrie had the crucial capability of “commercial expertise” 
for the management of the consortium. This capability was necessary for the 
continuous management of the alliance in terms of strategy and technology because 
it kept the alliance from deviating from its economic objectives (Muller, 1997). 
Additionally, through the efforts of Germany, the coordination of research and 
production, client interface and the highly symbolic function of test flying were in 
the hands of Airbus Industrie and out of the partners’ control. The strategic growth 
of Airbus was in the hands of ‘Airbus Industrie’. 
 
Third, the formation of ‘Airbus Industrie’ would stabilize the partnership and 
provide more maneuvering space, furthering the parties’ commitment and 
supporting further risks, primarily technological investments to follow 
technological advances. With the commitment of France and Germany to the 
project and a minimum level of confidence in the partnership, in the following year 
(1971), Spanish “Construcciones Aeronautics” (CASA) joined the partnership and 
took a 4.5 percent stake and the responsibility for designing an A300 horizontal tail 
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plane. For these changes, France and Germany each reduced their stake to 47.9 
percent. In fact, CASA designed and developed composites for some parts of the 
aircraft to make it lighter and a better wiring design that improved the aircraft’s 
efficiency. Finally, to facilitate physical growth, Airbus had to apply new 
technological devices such as the "Super Guppy", a U.S. built transport aircraft to 
accelerate the movement of resources among the different Airbus sites in Toulouse, 
Spain, and Germany.  
 
Flight Test, Introduction, and Initial Successes (1972-1973): Finally, the result of 
6 years of work by the consortium became available to test. On 28 October 1972, 
the A300 flew successfully for over 1 hour and 23 minutes, and the concept of the 
most economical aircraft in the market became a reality. However, despite the 
A300’s introduction, Airbus had to convince active airlines that the A300 was one 
of most efficient and economical aircraft available in the market. Additionally, they 
had to convince customers that A300 had been the result of a very close 
collaboration between the best European aviation companies. These facts were not 
at all clear to their customers, and time was needed to realize the value of this 
product. As a result, it was challenging to demonstrate the value of the partnership 
and the aircraft to the market and potential customers. Airbus went on a campaign 
at the Paris Air Show, where the A300 flew before thousands of guests. In addition, 
Airbus planned a spontaneous two week flight in which the A300 flew from 
Toulouse to South Africa, to Brazil, to Mexico, and to seven states in the U.S. 
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before finally returning to Toulouse. This spontaneous flight had an impressive 
effect on the customers in these different areas, and Airbus was able to collect over 
10 orders that year. In fact, as one of the managers said, “nothing like an aircraft 
itself could better sell the aircraft”. In May 1973, Lufthansa became the second 
airline to order the A300 (ordering 3 plus 6 options).  
 
This sale could be considered a success for Airbus, which had found it difficult to 
become established and to build an aircraft over the last 6 years. The sale helped 
Airbus to get an additional level of credibility beyond the initial order by Air 
France, and it contributed to the next stage of Airbus growth.  
 
The Subsequent Orders (1974-1977): In 1974, Airbus obtained another order from 
Korean Airlines. In the same year, they delivered the initial 6 A300s to Air France. 
In 1975, these orders were followed by orders from Indian Airlines followed by 
orders from African Airways and Air Inter. After these orders, an 18-month period 
started in December 1975 in which no orders came to Airbus (a black period), 
endangering the additional production of aircraft in Toulouse. However, Airbus 
managers kept their vision and continued to sell their product. These conditions 
continued until 1977, when Airbus received two orders (plus 2 options) from Thai 
Airlines in May 1977. This order was followed by 23 orders in March 1978 from 
Eastern Airlines, which was among the top four American airlines (this represented 
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the first order from an American airline). This order was a great success for Airbus 
because the US market was very competitive; receiving just one order from that 
market was a significant success as Airbus sought to expand its presence in the US 
market.  
 
All in all, the initial period of Airbus growth provided the company with a level of 
stability. In fact, Airbus had obtained a sufficient level of credibility, the 
consortium had become stable, and they had presented their initial product to the 
market. Through 10 years of activity, Airbus had become a stable aircraft producer 
active in the industry. Over these years, Airbus was able to deliver 81 A300s to 14 
airlines active in 100 cities in 43 countries. In addition, Airbus had an additional 
133 firm orders and 88 more options; further, after only 10 years, they had achieved 
26 percent of market share in dollar value. This stability allowed Airbus to pursue 
additional growth by introducing a new product that they had been planning since 
1976.  
 
4.5.2 Period 2: Technological Advancement and Consortium 
Enforcement (1977-1987) 
 
Change in strategy (1978): By this point, Airbus had moved from being a young 
partnership during the previous period to being a relatively established and stable 
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consortium. In addition, it had got enough credibility by delivering 30 aircraft to the 
market to be a strong and growing player compared to their American counterparts. 
This position gave Airbus the courage to move one step closer to their ambitious 
aim of becoming the dominant player in terms of technological advancement and 
market share. As a result, in this period, Airbus found it necessary to engage deeply 
in technological advancement; they therefore encouraged all of their partners to 
expend effort and push their current technological boundaries one step forward. 
However, it is worth noting that these investments were not being made for the sake 
of technological advancement but were investments toward delivering the most 
economical aircraft to their customers. In fact, during this period, Airbus strategy 
concentrated its efforts around technological advances that would provide the most 
economical aircraft in the market.   
 
Technological Advancements and Setting Standards, Launching the A310 
(1978): The early Airbus advancements were related to the A300 (and its different 
versions), which was the first two-engine aircraft and a very bold move that put 
three-engine aircraft behind in the 1960s. The use of composites (lighter and more 
resistant materials than pure metals such as aluminum) in the A300’s secondary 
structure was another advancement initiated and designed by the Spanish partner, 
CASA. These composites made the aircraft lighter and more efficient and provided 
the potential to carry more cargo. A version of the A300 (A300B4) in 1977 
obtained ETOPS permission to be the first two-engine aircraft to take long-distance 
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routes. However, a new stream of advancements was launched when Airbus 
announced a new aircraft, the A310, a short- and medium-range aircraft with 218 
seats in July 1978.  
 
The A310 was, in fact, a derivative of the A300 with which Airbus tried to further 
exploit the innovative skills and technological know-how of its partners. The A310 
was launched considering the need of the market (SwissAir and Lufthansa) for 
smaller aircraft. Airbus developed the A310 in collaboration with two airlines: 
SwissAir and Lufthansa. As a result of advances made in 1983 (which will be 
discussed later), with the A310, Airbus introduced (1) a new cockpit system and (2) 
a new type of composite, a lighter-weight carbon fiber reinforced plastic, used in 
the secondary structures such as spoilers, airbrakers, and rudder, that lightened the 
aircraft and opened further capacity for carriers (these composites were initially 
tested in the A300). On 15 March 1978, SwissAir became the first airline to place 
an order for the A310, including 10 more options. Lufthansa quickly placed an 
order for 10 A310, and Air France and Iberia were among the subsequent 
customers. On 1 April 1979, Lufthansa increased its order to 25 plus 25 options, 
and two days later, KLM added another 10 plus 10 options. On 6 July, Air France 
raised its orders to from 4 to 35 and in the same year, Martinair, Sabena, and Air 
Afrique joined the list. 
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The Return of the British Government and Consortium Enforcement (1978): 
Once Airbus (1) secured its position within the market with its two primary 
products, the A300 and especially the A310, and (2) definitively demonstrated its 
technological advancements, the British asked to return and become a full partner. 
This move followed 10 orders from British Airways for A300s in 1978, which was 
one of the conditions for the British partner to return: that British airlines should 
become engaged with Airbus products if Britain wanted to return to the Airbus 
consortium. To return, Britain provided Airbus with 50 billion pounds in a 
returnable loan and received back approximately 20% of the total stake in “Airbus 
Industrie”, equivalent to the amount it would have as a partner of the consortium. 
For these changes, the shares of Germany and France decreased to 37.5 while the 
share of Spain (CASA) remained intact. The return was threefold. First, Britain’s 
involvement provided strong enforcement in terms of technological advancements 
for the consortium because they had advanced engine design capabilities that would 
benefit Airbus. Second, Airbus could become a stronger entity with the financial 
resources of the new partner. Third, by this move, the party would become a 
collaborator instead of being a potential competitor and the consortium would 
include four key players in the commercial aircraft industry for advancing new 
products and technologies.  
    
The Oil Crisis (1979): The oil crisis in 1979 was a key event that significantly 
affected the world economy and, in particular, the commercial aviation industry. In 
 100 
1979, oil prices increased significantly, decreasing the demand for flight-based trips 
around the world. Consequently, airlines had to decrease their costs, and so they 
started looking for more economical aircraft to match their capacity to market 
demand. As a result, short- to medium-range, 150 seat aircraft and, in general, more 
fuel-efficient aircraft assumed the center of attention. Airbus’ moment had arrived: 
in fact, the change in demand brought Airbus an enormous advantage over other 
companies, given their almost one decade of effort developing the most efficient 
aircraft in the industry. As a result, Airbus announced a new aircraft that was 
consistent with both its new aircraft growth strategy and the environmental 
conditions. However, additional technological investments were needed to make the 
new aircraft more economically efficient than the two previous products. 
 
The A320 Selection; A Family Approach (1981): As Airbus was considering how 
to achieve a dominant position in the market, from its early moments, it wanted to 
develop a portfolio of aircraft (taking a family approach) over time. In fact, at the 
heart of their strategy, they were looking for greater flexibility by providing a wider 
range of products to their customers in terms of seat capacity and trip length. After 
introducing the A300 and the A310 (medium-range aircraft), with the A320, Airbus 
took the next step in their new aircraft development strategy (in terms of seat 
capacity and length of trip). Additionally, the market demand after the oil crisis 
made a medium-range single-aisle 130-170 seat aircraft (A320) the most 
appropriate option for Airbus’ growth. Despite the fit between Airbus’ growth stage 
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and environmental demand for the A320, there was pressure from the partners to 
consider the A330/340, a high-capacity twin, ultra-long-range four-engine aircraft, 
as another choice for development.  
 
Finally, Airbus chose to develop the A320 because it was aligned with its internal 
growth stage and it met market demand. Additionally, technological limitations 
would impose a greater level of risk on the consortium in the case of the A330/340 
because, until that moment, Airbus had only worked on small and mid-range 
aircraft; jumping to large aircraft would involve much more uncertainty and 
unpredictable complexity. Airbus had been capitalizing and leveraging its 
technologies and developing new aircraft based on previously developed models 
(A300 and A310); in each new aircraft, they added new features and technologies. 
Therefore, choosing a smaller aircraft (A320) with new technological advances 
would decrease the pressure compared a large four-engine A330/340. As one of the 
managers describes, "correcting a mistake is much cheaper, and the accumulation of 
experience is faster with a smaller, short-range aircraft which makes many more 
flights and is used in larger numbers than the long-range".  
 
Receiving the initial orders and the incremental achievement of market share 
(1981): In June 1981, at the Paris Air Show, Air France announced its intention to 
buy 25 of the planned A320s, with an option to buy 25 more. However, the A320 
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was only officially launched in March 1984 due to delays in funding and the 
complexity of coordinating between the partners. In addition, the number of non-
sold built aircraft (called "whitetails") was increasing in Toulouse because 
customers had cancelled their orders following the economic recession in the early 
1980s. Despite these problems, when the A320 was launched, Airbus announced an 
impressive portfolio of 80 orders from five customers including Air France, Air 
Inter, Cyprus Airways, Index Adria of Yugoslavia, and subsequently British 
Caledonian and British Airways. Additionally, an A320 order from Pan Am was an 
unexpected success, representing the first order from an American airline for the 
A320 when there was intense competition from American producers in the U.S. 
market. Eventually, the A320 family became one the best-selling jetliner aircraft 
families ever in Airbus history.  
  
Cockpit Technology Advancement (1982): In 1982, a new cockpit (a Forward-
Facing Crew Cockpit) was designed for the under-development A310, which 
represented a huge advancement in terms of its human-computer interface. The 
cockpit is basically the flight deck and includes the set of necessary controls for 
pilot. In the new cockpit, new digital gauges instead of analogue ones were used, 
which made it possible to fly the aircraft with only two pilots and without the need 
of a flight engineer. In fact, the A310 was the initial step in Airbus’ commonality 
strategy because the aircraft, to a great extent, was designed based on the A300. 
Additionally, the A310 was a link between the A300 and A320 in the sequential 
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development and introduction of new aircraft by Airbus. The A310 brought Airbus’ 
different technological advancements into one aircraft. In addition, the A300 family 
was subsequently updated according to the A310’s advancements, which helped 
Airbus to maintain homogenous growth in terms of resource accumulation. 
 
Composites in the Primary Structure (1985): In 1985, two years after the first 
flight of the A310, composites were applied in the primary structure of the new 
A320, making the primary structure much lighter and significantly improving the 
fuel efficiency of the aircraft. Airbus, from an early moment, emphasized the value 
of composite components because their resistance and lower weight improved the 
efficiency of the aircraft. This progress of using composite was applied to the A300 
and A310 in the following years.  
 
Fly-By-Wire, the Flourish of Airbus’ Technological Advancement (1987): One of 
the exceptional innovations of Airbus in this period was “Fly-By-Wire” (FBW), 
which was introduced in the A320 with its first flight in 1987. In previous aircraft, 
the A300 and A310, Airbus used an electrical signaling system on the secondary 
flight control, replacing a web of cables and pulleys that was similar to the 
traditional industry version. However, in the A320, Airbus aimed to develop this 
technology one step further into a computer-driven digital “fly-by-wire” in which 
“the deflections of the flying control surface on the wing and tail are no longer 
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driven by pilots' controls, but by a computer which calculates exactly which control 
surface deflections are needed to make the aircraft respond as the pilot wishes”. 
With this new technology, the pilots only needed to work with a simple side-stick 
control instead of using different control columns. The Airbus version of FBW was 
not just a technology that facilitated flight controls and reduced weight. In fact, it 
improved the reliability of flights because it prevented pilots from initiating sets of 
maneuvers outside of the aircraft capacity. The technology was groundbreaking and 
shaped the development of the commercial aviation industry; in the following 
years, it became one of the industry standards and one of Airbus’ sources of 
competitive advantage.  
 
 
4.6 Findings and Discussion  
 
Here, we try to confront our theoretical model with the analytic story discussed 
above and trace the model within the growth of Airbus (See Table 4.1). Looking at 
the data, three main cycles of new products were realized sequentially related to the 
A300, A310, and A320. As can be observed from the data, when Airbus developed 
a new aircraft or technological advance, this stock would become a base that Airbus 
could build on in the following stages of its growth in the form of (1) capitalizing 
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and developing its subsequent new products, (2) improving its current products, and 
(3) enforcing its position in the market by obtaining further orders.  
 
First Cycle: As was discussed in the story, the first cycle was the period of A300 
production. In 1967 (the starting point of the cycle), the parties brought their 
complementary assets, primarily their technological ones, under the Airbus 
agreement. For the A300, the partners tried to push the boundaries of technological 
advances one step forward using the expertise of each of party in the aircraft 
industry (R&D activities). Each of these partners specialized in the production of 
one part of the aircraft (see the section on signing the collaboration memorandum). 
Because they were concerned with the economic efficiency of the product, the 
A300 was designed as a two-engine aircraft in collaboration with Air France and 
Lufthansa, who would be the final users of the product. Due to external pressures, 
such as problems obtaining the necessary engines or doubts regarding the viability 
of the project, the development of an A300 with its initial characteristics was 
abandoned. Airbus was forced to change the initial design of its product, and the 
new design and advances resulted in the development of the A300B a two-engine 
aircraft with 250 seats (1969). However, when the A300 designed was finalized 
(1969), the product and technological advances around the product proved to be a 
source of competitive advantage and attracted several orders from Air France and 
Lufthansa even before the product’s introduction to the market in 1973. 
Additionally, after rolling out the product in 1973, from 1973 to 1976, Airbus 
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pushed to open its position in the market and obtain new orders through different 
airshows and direct contact with international airlines (e.g., Indian Airlines, African 
Airlines).  
 
Second cycle: The second cycle of new product development started during 1976/7, 
when Airbus identified a need in the market for smaller aircraft and started planning 
its new aircraft, the A310. The A310 would be a mid-range aircraft based on the 
knowledge built and accumulated around the A300 while, at the same, Airbus 
would develop new technologies and components, including a new cockpit system 
and composites in the secondary structure of the plane. Firstly, Airbus leveraged the 
assets of the A300 into the A310 as part of a strategy that determined that all 
products should share a maximum level of commonality. Second, the A310 should 
be more efficient than the A300, and therefore, the parties developed a new cockpit 
system and a lighter and more resistant aircraft. While the A310 was still under 
design and development, Airbus was able to obtain over 100 orders after its 
announcement in 1978 until the end of 1979, allowing the A310 project to continue. 
Additionally, the technological advances developed for the A310 also helped 
Airbus to homogeneously improve its current products, the A300 family.  
 
During this cycle, Airbus’ position stabilized as the number of deliveries exceeded 
100 by the end of 1970s. Airbus also had two products in this period. Finally and 
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more importantly, there was an increasing number of orders for both the A300 and 
the A310, demonstrating the credibility of Airbus as an aircraft producer.  
 
Third cycle: The third cycle started with the oil crisis in 1979 as an external shock 
in the environment that pushed airlines to search for more economical aircraft while 
also decreasing their buying ability. This crisis showed the value of Airbus’ efforts 
over the last ten years to build economical aircraft. To respond to the market, 
Airbus aimed to develop the A320 as the most economical and fuel-efficient 
aircraft. Similar to the previous cycle, Airbus both (1) leveraged the accumulated 
resources of its two previous aircraft (A300 and A310) into the A320 and (2) 
reinforced its R&D activities to develop the groundbreaking technology, Fly-By-
Wire. Airbus also developed new composites for the primary structures of the 
aircraft, making the aircraft lighter, able to carry more cargo, and able to use less 
fuel. It is worth mentioning that the A320 was selected although there was pressure 
from the partners to develop a bigger aircraft, the A330/340, but Airbus continued 
its A320 aircraft. Demonstrating its great success, upon the launch of the A320 in 
1984, Airbus had already received over 80 orders from different airlines such as Air 
France, British Airways, and Air Inter. Following these advances, Airbus updated 
the rest of its aircraft with the current technology to bring its maximum 
commonalities strategy to the center of its growth. In fact, commonalities became 
one of Airbus’ dominant competitive advantages as it developed its family of 
aircraft (the A310, the A320, and subsequently the A340).  
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The discussion above supports our cyclical model of Airbus’ new aircraft 
development as the engine of Airbus growth over the first 20 years of its life. The 
model allows us to move to a higher level of abstraction and trace the underlying 
pattern of Airbus’ sustainable growth over the period of study, identifying how the 
product development cycle works as an engine of asset accumulation within Airbus.   
 
 
4.6.1 Underlying Pattern of Airbus Growth  
 
Incremental Nature of Growth: The findings discussed above illustrate the 
incremental growth of resource accumulation as the dominant pattern contributing 
to the sustainability of Airbus’ strategic growth over the period of study. The 
incremental growth shows itself first to be (1) the piecemeal accumulation of 
different stocks of assets, primarily in terms of technological advancements and 
credibility, and second, (2) not taking large jumps in accumulation, as discussed in 
the following. 
 
Piecemeal accumulation of resources: First, from its earliest moments, Airbus 
managers had the vision of a family of products that would cover a wide range of 
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distances and different levels of capacity. As the data show, to create this family, 
each period Airbus focused on one cycle of new aircraft and each cycle offered the 
chance to gradually accumulate new resources in terms of new designs and 
technologies. In the first cycle, Airbus took 6 years, from 1967 until 1973, to have 
the A300 ready for flight. In addition, in this period, Airbus also needed and was 
able to establish its position in the market as a young aircraft producer before 
further advances. This market position allowed the intense advertisement of the 
A300 in the market during this period through different air shows, campaigns and 
direct visits to airlines to obtain the necessary orders (e.g., Indian Airlines in 1974, 
Thai Airlines in 1977, Eastern Airlines in 1977/8).  
 
In 1978, almost 11 years after the birth of Airbus and when it became stable (in 
term of the increasing number of orders and number of deliveries), the company 
started accumulating new technological resources through the announcement of the 
A310 as a new member of the family. In fact, during these years, the delivery of 
over 40 A300s gave Airbus the chance to accumulate enough knowledge and 
technological resources to move to the A310. Their planning was timely in terms of 
Swiss-Air’s and Lufthansa’s need for smaller aircraft flying shorter routes. As 
discussed previously, for the A310, Airbus increased its R&D activities and started 
accumulating a new stream of technological resources to push the boundaries of 
technological advance one step forward. It took Airbus 5 years to introduce the 
A310, from its announcement in 1978 to its first flight and delivery in 1983. During 
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this period, under the umbrella of the A310, Airbus was able to develop a new 
cockpit and composites that permanently contributed to the secondary structure of 
the aircraft.  
 
Finally, the same pattern of incremental asset accumulation can be observed in the 
case of the A320. When Airbus announced the A320, they had sufficient orders for 
the A310 (over 100 at that point) and, in addition, there was a clear need for more 
fuel-efficient aircraft. Similar to the previous cycle, under the umbrella of the A320, 
Airbus developed additional new technologies (FBW) over almost 4 years (from 
1983/4 to 1987). Upon announcement of the A320, Airbus had already received 
over 80 orders for this planned aircraft, showing Airbus’ credibility and stable 
position. In fact, each cycle of new product development became the basis for the 
piecemeal accumulation of new technologies under the umbrella of a new aircraft.  
 
Not taking large jumps in resource accumulation: Another indicator 
demonstrating Airbus’ incremental approach can be demonstrated by the fact that 
Airbus did not take very large jumps in its asset accumulation.  
 
The first occasion on which Airbus declined to take a large jump dates back to the 
initial design of the A300. In fact, the A300 significantly shifted the current norms 
of aircraft design (300 passenger aircraft with 2 engines) and so faced pressure from 
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airlines and even partners about its viability, which resulted in the separation of the 
British from the consortium. The pressure and the lack of a planned engine finally 
stopped Airbus from further developing the A300 using the initial design and 
pushed it to modify and pursue the A300 for 250 passengers using engines available 
within the market. As discussed earlier, these changes were not problematic, they 
were positive because the demand for large-size aircraft was diminishing and the 
initial A300 design could have faced problems that would have affected Airbus’ 
growth. In addition, the smaller size of the aircraft lowered the risk of project 
failure.  
 
The second indicator of this avoidance of large jumps can be observed when Airbus 
started a new cycle. Airbus did not jump quickly from the A300 to the A310, but 
maintained the accumulation of resources with their current A300, waiting 9 years 
to pursue the A310. In the case of the A300, once they developed the A300B, they 
developed several similar derivatives such as the A300B1, A300B2, and A300B4, 
which had very minor differences from the A300B but varied according to the 
specific need of the airlines, for example in the internal design of the aircraft such 
as the number of seats, their locations, etc.  
 
The third indicator is evident in the selection of each new aircraft. For example, in 
the selection of the A320 versus the bigger A340, Airbus pursued a smaller aircraft 
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because it included a lower level of risk and they could accumulate the related 
resources in a shorter period of time. The A340, as a wide-body aircraft with a 
carrying capacity of over 380 passengers, would be a very large jump for Airbus, 
which had been producing aircraft with a maximum of 270 passengers. This jump 
would change all of the relevant designs, would not allow for technological 
advancement, and would made it impossible for the firm to fully benefit from its 
previous assets. Pursuing a smaller aircraft allowed Airbus to develop more new 
technologies and commonalities that could be applied to the subsequent A340 and 
smooth its development. As Beteille describes, “correcting a mistake is much 
cheaper, and the accumulation of experience is faster with a smaller, short-range 
aircraft which makes many more flights and is used in larger numbers than the 
long-range”.  
 
To further elaborate the incremental growth of Airbus, we expand our discussion on 
two assets of Airbus, mainly credibility and technological advances. 
 
Credibility: Credibility was one of the assets indicated by our analysis of the data. 
Credibility, in fact, was one of the primary accumulated stocks contributing to the 
sustainability of Airbus (competitive advantage) in different stages of its growth. 
The initial level of Airbus’ credibility came from its partners, who represented the 
best European players in the aviation industry. However, these players were not 
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known as part of the Airbus collaboration. Airbus started to build and accumulate 
its credibility more significantly with the initial order from Air France and the 
subsequent order from Lufthansa. As Dierickx and Cool (1989) state, credibility is 
a strategic asset that should be built and accumulated over time, and it is not 
available to the firm in a strategic factor market (Barney, 1986). After the two 
initial orders, the first flight of the A300, the additional orders, and the unique 
features of the A300 itself contributed to the credibility of Airbus as an aircraft 
builder. The first flight of the A300 was an impressive event in front of thousands 
of guests and was followed by the spontaneous flight of the A300 over Africa, Latin 
America, and the United States. In fact, the A300 had unique features, most 
importantly, efficiency. However, given the nature of aircraft and the time needed 
to acquaint customers with the product, Airbus still needed the time provided by the 
additional orders received in 1977 and 1978. This credibility contributed to Airbus’ 
stability during the first decade of its life and committed the partners to further 
R&D activities during the second decade as presented in the story. The return of the 
British partner with a 50 million pound investment is one of the major events 
demonstrating the increasing credibility of Airbus as an aircraft producer in the late 
1980s. In the second decade, the introduction of new aircraft (A310 & A320) and 
several ground-breaking technological advances additionally supported Airbus’ 
reputation as a reliable player in the market and allowed Airbus to obtain a 
significant increase in the number of orders from 1978 to 1979 and 1987 to 1990.  
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Technological advances: In the first period of Airbus growth (the initial 6 years), 
the resource stocks of Airbus’ partners were used as the basis for the initial 
technological advancements. During this period, using the R&D capabilities of its 
partners, Airbus advanced and improved the technological stock of its partners to a 
higher level to roll out their first aircraft, the A300. In the subsequent stage, once 
the A310 was selected as the next product, Airbus’ R&D capabilities helped to 
reconfigure and leverage the knowledge accumulated from the A300 to the A310 
while simultaneously helping Airbus to develop new technological advances for a 
more efficient aircraft. These technological advances allowed a more complex and 
sophisticated aircraft. In fact, the A310 shared a set of characteristics with the A300 
while also including a new cockpit system and more composites in its structure. A 
similar cycle was realized in the case of the A320, when the accumulated 
knowledge from the A310 was leveraged into the A320 while new additional R&D 
activities also contributed the groundbreaking Fly-By-Wire. Although technological 
advances took a central role in all periods of Airbus growth, in the second decade of 
Airbus life (1978-1987), R&D took a dominant role in that all Airbus asset stocks 
concentrated around these advancements. After the introduction of the A320, 
because Airbus relied on a commonality strategy, these stocks became the primary 
source of Airbus competitive advantage in the following years. In fact, in 2014, 
FBW is still one of the standards in the commercial aircraft industry. The 
discussion provided here supports the theoretical model provided in the second part 
of the study (See Table 4.3).  
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Product Features New features 
A300 -- Initial design  
A310 Derivative of A300  New cockpit  
New control system 
Complete use of composites for the secondary structure of the 
aircraft 
New size  
A320 Derivative of A310 Use of composites in the primary structure of the aircraft 
Fly-By-Wire 
New size 
Table 4.3 Airbus Technological Advances 
 
Commonalities: As was discussed above, maximum commonality was one the 
central strategies behind airbus growth. First, in the development of new aircraft, 
Airbus capitalized on previously developed technologies while simultaneously 
improving their new technologies. As Table 4.3 shows, each new aircraft provides a 
point of connection between the previous and the subsequent products. The 
commonality strategy started with the development of the A310 based on the 
previous knowledge from the A300 family while also adding new features and 
innovations to the aircraft. Airbus additionally updated the A300 family with the 
new A310 technologies, primarily the new cockpit, in 1983. In other words, second, 
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once Airbus had a significant technological advancement, it updated its existing 
aircraft with the new technologies. In fact, incremental asset accumulation and 
commonalities became the cornerstone of Airbus success because all aircraft had 
the maximum level of commonality. The commonality strategy flourished with Fly-
By-Wire at the introduction of the A320. Regardless of the size or weight of the 
aircraft, fly-by-wire became a central concept in the entire Airbus family (see 
Figure 4.2).  
 
The commonality strategy allowed Airbus to efficiently capitalize on its assets for 
each new aircraft. First, commonality provided the basis for development and 
allowed Airbus to benefit from economies of scale. Second, commonality also was 
helpful to benefit from economies of scope as a basis to expand the Airbus family 
of aircraft. This foundation accelerated the rhythm for the introduction of new 
aircraft in the following years. In fact, the concept became one of the primary 
sources of Airbus competitive advantage, and it was very difficult for other players 
to imitate Airbus. Third, the commonality strategy was not only helpful to Airbus 
but was helpful to its customers as well. Large airlines such as Air France and 
Lufthansa had a broad portfolio of aircrafts. The airlines could plan and utilize their 
aircraft according to their periodic forecasts of market demand. Because of the 
commonality between different Airbus aircraft, airlines could jump between these 
aircraft, particularly in the case of pilots and cabin crew, to respond to changing 
market demand. This flexibility additionally led to considerable reductions in the 
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time and costs involved in training pilots and crew, positively contributing to the 
airlines’ cost efficiency and planning.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Airbus Growth Map 
 
Outcome: The outcome of Airbus growth, in addition to its technological 
advancement, can be traced through the number of deliveries over these years. 
Figure 4.3 shows how the number of Airbus deliveries grew incrementally from 
1973 to 1987. Over 20 years (the period of our study), Airbus introduced three new 
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aircraft (with several different options) plus a significant number of groundbreaking 
technologies. In the early period, Airbus was not known in the market and only 
produced one aircraft (A300) [1973-1976]. The intensive market activities of 
Airbus resulted in a significant number of orders in 1978 and 1979. In the second 
cycle, when the A310 was added to the family of products, Airbus had two aircraft 
(A300 and A310) and was providing a wider range of options (Figure 4.3). The 
total number of Airbus deliveries continued increasing because of their wider range 
of efficient aircraft, which could help airlines compensate for the oil crisis and the 
general economic recession. This increase repeated one more time as part of the 
third cycle, when the A320 was also added to the family of products, providing 
Airbus with 3 aircraft and a wider range of options. Although the period of our 
analysis does not cover the third and fourth decade of Airbus’ life, in 2003, Airbus 
passed its primary competitor Boeing in terms of orders and deliveries and became 
a pioneer of the commercial aircraft industry in terms of market share.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Number of Deliveries 
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4.7 Conclusion  
 
In this study answering the question “how do firms grow sustainably in dynamic 
technology-intensive industries?” we presented the successful case of the Airbus 
consortium from its birth until the moment that it became a pioneer in the 
commercial aircraft industry in terms of technological advances. We proposed a 
process-based model of sustainable growth and supported it in the context of a 
dynamic and technology-intensive industry. We found the incremental and 
piecemeal accumulation of resources to be the primary underlying pattern behind 
the sustainable growth of Airbus over the period of study. In fact, after the 
introduction of its first aircraft, cycles of continuous innovation, improvement, and 
introduction of (new) products, contributed to Airbus’ incremental accumulation of 
resources over time. Using the maximum commonalities between their aircraft 
when developing their technological assets and aircraft, Airbus has been able to 
improve the efficiency of their growth. Additionally, keeping the family of aircraft 
updated with the most recent technologies based on the commonality strategy 
helped Airbus to develop their products in a homogeneous way and benefit from 
economies of scale and scope over time.  
 
This study contributes to current streams on Asset Accumulation Theory (AAT) 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989) and Dynamic Capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) 
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in the strategy literature by confronting a theoretical model with empirical data. The 
study proposes and empirically supports a process-based model of sustainable 
growth of the firm through the cyclical introduction and improvement of new 
products. In addition, the study complements the previous studies in the field by 
addressing a successful case of growth from the firm’s birth until the moment that it 
became a pioneer in its environment. Previous studies have tended to focus on other 
stages of firm growth such as decline (e.g., Danneels 2002). It is worth mentioning 
that this study does not allow for generalization because we have relied on only one 
case, which is a limitation of our study. However, we emphasize that the aim of the 
study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying processes of firm 
growth as suggested by previous studies (e.g., Danneels 2002, Danneels 2011). 
Because at the current moment, the field has an emerging nature, more qualitative 
studies can uncover the nature of firm sustainable growth in the case of dynamic 
environments. In addition, our study provides a reliable base for future qualitative 
and survey-based empirical studies in the field.  
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Chapter 5: 
Managing the Post-Divorce Crisis of Strategic 
Alliances 
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5.1 Abstract 
 
One very probable result of any alliance is a failure-driven crisis followed by a 
dissolved alliance. Drawing on both the motion theory of classical physics and the 
concept of resources, we provide a theoretical approach to a failed party’s behavior 
related to an unexpectedly terminated alliance. We discuss two main forces, both of 
which contribute to the failed party’s survival: (1) moving inertia; and (2) new 
moving forces. We primarily discuss the fact that resources with moving inertia will 
help a failed party to keep its business operating at a minimum level while also 
helping to create new moving forces to overcome the crisis. In addition, we discuss 
the change speed of resources as an underlying factor that helps managers to realize 
those resources that either: (1) have moving inertia; or (2) can be used to create new 
moving forces. 
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5.2 Introduction 
 
During the last three decades, strategic alliances have gained a dominant position in 
firms’ strategies (Bruner and Spekman 1998, Gulati and Singh 1998). Such 
alliances are formed to satisfy different companies’ objectives, such as access to 
complementary resources, risk sharing, and entry into new markets (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996). Although the rate of alliance formation has drastically 
increased, alliances are not only inherently difficult but also have a high rate of 
instability and failure (Gulati et al. 2008, McCutchen et al. 2008). Some studies 
have reported alliance failure rates up to, and even exceeding, 50 or 60 %, 
depending on the studied alliances’ type and context (e.g. Das and Teng 2000, 
Gulati et al. 2008, Park and Ungson 2001, Bruner and Spekman 1998). However, 
despite the high rate of alliance failure and termination, academic studies have 
neglected the behavior of failed parties after termination (Arino and Doz 2000, 
Gulati et al. 2008).  
 
Some studies have examined alliance termination under the umbrella of various 
disciplines—primarily strategy, organizational behavior, and marketing. These 
studies can be divided into two main streams: (1) studies that examine “why” 
alliances terminate; and (2) studies that examine “how” alliances terminate. The 
first stream looks at the causes of alliance termination, failure, and instability, 
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mostly in the case of (international) joint ventures (e.g. Das and Teng 2000a, 
Sadowski and Duysters 2008, Yan 1998, Yan and Zeng 1999, Parkhe 1993). The 
second stream of studies looks at the processes by and/or ways through which an 
alliance is terminated (e.g. Alajoutsijärvi et al. 2000, Peng and Shenkar 2002, 
Gulati et al. 2008). Most of the studies have examined alliances before their point 
of termination (except the studies by (Singh and Mitchell 1996) and (Reuer and 
Zollo 2005)) because they seek to minimize failure rates through either increasing 
the stability of an alliance or identifying factors that contribute to the success of an 
alliance. However, the literature neglects the impact of failure (e.g. crisis) as a very 
probable condition after the point of termination (Gulati et al. 2008).  
 
To address this gap, we provide a theoretical approach to the post-divorce condition 
of an alliance when a failed party is in crisis and discuss how a firm might behave 
to overcome the condition of difficulty. We describe firms’ post-divorce behavior 
and the impact that an unexpected divorce has on the failed party. It is worth 
mentioning that by termination, we refer to an alliance dissolution that implies that 
a failed party is left alone (i.e., it neither merges nor is acquired after the 
dissolution) and has to manage the crisis alone (e.g., Gulati el at. 2008, Harrison 
2004). Drawing on the motion theory of physics as a novel perspective, we discuss 
two main forces—(1) moving positive inertia; and (2) new moving forces—that help 
a firm during the crisis. Regarding the first force, a firm’s previously positive 
implemented strategies will act as moving inertia and will help the firm to avoid 
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losing everything at once. Moreover, those strategies will also help to create new 
moving forces through a rapid response after the point of termination.  
 
Thus, this paper aims at contributing to current studies in failed terminated 
alliances. In addition, because failed alliances have been considered to be very 
frequent (Bruner and Spekman 1998, Das and Teng 2000a, Park and Ungson 2001, 
Gulati et al. 2008), the provided framework will be of high value for managers and 
practitioners. In the following sections, we first explain what we mean by resources 
as the foundation of our theorization. Second, we describe the crisis condition of a 
firm after a failed terminated alliance. Third, we provide a theoretical framework of 
helpful forces, which draws on the motion theory of classical physics. Fourth, we 
discuss the change speed of resources as the underlying factor that helps managers 
to learn where they can benefit from moving inertia and/or new moving forces. 
Fifth, we provide a series of propositions about the conditions and ways in which a 
failed party can overcome the crisis condition after a failed terminated alliance.  
 
5.3 Firm Resources 
 
To open our discussion of the crisis condition of a failed terminated alliance, the 
bases of our theorization are: (1) resources; and (2) bundles of resources (Penrose 
1959). The reason that we selected these concepts is that they will give us enough 
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degrees of freedom to conceptualize firms (Penrose 1959) and the impact of failed 
terminated alliances. In addition, these concepts enable us to connect different 
theoretical perspectives, primarily motion theory and the speed of change. Finally, 
these concepts maintain a neutral and indifferent position and do not bias our 
theorization in a specific direction or towards other concepts. For example, the 
concept of power finds meaning in a relationship between two parties, with one 
party directing the other party; this is not the case with the concept of resources.   
 
By resources we mean trade contracts, skilled personnel, machinery, efficient 
procedures, capital, and brand names, and in-house knowledge of (both tangible 
and intangible) technology tied semi-permanently to a firm (Wernerfelt 1984). 
Resources are often bundled together (Penrose 1959) to contribute to the value-
creating activities of a firm that is responding to market demand. A team, a 
machine, a department, an alliance, a production line, or a firm culture can be 
considered as a bundle of resources (Barney 1991). In the end, a firm itself can be 
considered as a bundle of resources that contributes to its market (Penrose 1959). 
Using the concept of resources and resource bundles as our starting point, we 
provide the assumptions of this study in the following section.  
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5.4 Assumptions  
 
In our study, we first assume the existence of an independent, mature firm, with a 
strategic alliance (excluding joint ventures), that is relatively active in its industry. 
By strategic, we mean that the alliance plays a significant role in the firm’s 
business or its revenue-generating performance (Gulati et al. 2008; Harrison 2004). 
We use “relatively active in its industry” to mean that the firm has a minimum level 
of managerial capability to conduct the business in a manner that not only ensures 
the firm’s survival but also provides an expected level of satisficing growth 
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas 2011) as its normal growth condition. The condition 
that we address is one in which an alliance is unexpectedly dissolved in failure and 
a firm, as the alliance’s failed party, is left alone after the dissolution (Gulati et al. 
2008; Harrison 2004).  
 
In this regard, Gulati et al. (2008) have provided the example of an independent, 
active, mature firm engaged in an R&D, trust-based alliance with a larger, powerful 
partner. The relationship between the two parties is dissolved in failure and the 
failed party that has invested a large part of its business into the alliance enters into 
a state of crisis. In addition, the author has reported that a failed, dissolved alliance 
hugely affects a failed party’s other businesses, and none of its ongoing investments 
made during the alliance period are recoverable following the dissolution. As a 
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result, the party is pushed to rapidly dissolve all of its other alliances with major 
clients and then to file for bankruptcy. This story provides our study with its next 
assumption.  
 
Our second assumption is that due to the crisis of a terminated alliance, a firm is not 
in bankruptcy and still has the chance to continue its business. To clarify this 
assumption, it is worthwhile to note that when a strategic alliance terminates in 
failure, not only is a firm unable to meet objectives, such as having a specific level 
of revenue, but additional failure costs (losses) also enter into the equation [e.g., 
revenue (which is missed) – normal costs – failure costs (and losses)]. Due to the 
failure event, a firm may be affected in a way that makes the continuation of its 
business no longer satisficing and, as a result, it may be reasonable for the business 
to file for bankruptcy. How a firm finds itself in this state depends on the 
importance of the (failed) terminated alliance and the extent to which different 
bundles of firm resources have been affected due to the termination (Gulati et al. 
2008, Harrison 2004). 
 
If a bundle of resources has been hugely affected (either missed or destroyed), or if 
some bundles have been affected on specific levels (as affected bundles of 
resources), a firm’s dis-satisficing condition may continue and drive the firm into 
bankruptcy. In this regard, Harrison (2004) has discussed a long-term, vertical, 
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forward alliance in which a failed party has targeted 90 % of its business, using 
very specific assets, at its partner, the party’s only client. After dissolution, the 
failed party is greatly affected, resulting in bankruptcy (Harrison 2004).  
 
Our third assumption is that it is possible for a firm to go back to its growth 
condition by implementing strategies to address its post-termination crisis. Our 
fourth assumption is that a firm is interested in continuing its business and survival. 
Our final assumption is that due to resource constraints and limitations, a firm does 
not have the ability to pursue a radical strategy to completely re-organize its 
business into a new, non-relevant business within a short period of time after the 
termination. In the next part of this paper, based on the provided assumptions, we 
conceptualize the post-divorce behavior of a failed party drawing on the concepts of 
resources and resource bundles.  
 
 
5.5 A Failed Terminated Alliance  
 
As discussed above, when an alliance terminates and fails, one very probable result 
is that the alliance’s failed party will experience a crisis condition (e.g., Gulati et al. 
2008). By crisis, we mean that in a very short period of time, due to the dissolved 
alliance, a major, value-creating part of a firm may unexpectedly be lost or become 
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non-beneficial in such a way that the firm has little time to respond (Pearson and 
Clair 1998); furthermore, the continuation of this condition may result in 
bankruptcy (Gulati et al. 2008, Harrison 2004). Depending on the severity of the 
failure, managers must respond rapidly to survive and overcome the crisis condition 
(Gulati et al. 2008, Harrison 2004). Despite the high failure rate of alliances and the 
catastrophic impact of a terminated alliance (Das and Teng 2000a), the alliance 
termination literature has been silent about this condition (Ariño and Doz 2000, 
Gulati et al. 2008). 
 
After an alliance is terminated in failure, a failed party may experience various 
types of difficulties (Singh and Mitchell 1996). A review of the alliance termination 
and alliance failure literature has identified different groups of difficulties, 
including but not limited to financial problems (e.g., debts and other costs of 
failure) (Harrison 2004, Gulati et al. 2008), social and psychological problems 
(e.g., the stress imposed on firm employees due to the crisis condition) (Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994), operational problems (e.g., losing a distribution line or losing 
an input for value-creation processes) (Bruner and Spekman 1998), and 
reputational problems (e.g., the negative impact of being known as a failed party in 
a long-term strategic relationship) (Yu et al. 2008, Jensen and Roy 2008). To clarify 
these concepts, we divide an alliance’s post-termination challenges into two main 
categories: missed and destroyed forms of resources.  
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The term missed resources refers to those groups of resources lost due to a failed 
terminated alliance. For example, specific assets or technologies devoted to either a 
horizontal, joint, R&D alliance (Bruner and Spekman 1998, Gulati et al. 2008) or a 
long-term, forward alliance (Harrison, 2004) may no longer be usable and can be 
considered to be missed resources. In addition, we divide these missed resources 
into highly specific and less specific categories (similar to Williamson 1979). 
Highly specific missed resources are those resources that are very specific to the ex-
relationship, such as highly partner-specific assets that can no longer be used for 
current or future opportunities (i.e., they are absolutely missed). Less specific 
missed resources are those that might still have the chance to be used (partly) either 
for current situations or future opportunities. For example, such resources can be 
reassigned elsewhere within the firm.  
 
The term destroyed resources means that a specific bundle of resources becomes 
negative and not only loses its benefits but also may take a position against a firm. 
For example, when a firm terminates a strategic forward relationship with a 
strategic buyer, its reputation may be destroyed and result in the termination of 
relationships with other customers due to the concerns of those customers about the 
reasons for the failed terminated alliance (Jensen and Roy 2008). This is especially 
true when security analysts continuously review firm behaviors and issue reports 
that can affect a firm’s share value (Jensen and Roy 2008).  
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With respect to the issues set forth above, after the failed terminated alliance, we 
can see a whole firm as a bundle of two groups of resources: (1) non- (or low-) 
affected resources; and (2) highly-affected resources. By non- (or low-) affected 
resources, we mean those resources with value-creating roles that are aligned and 
compatible with the whole, stable, normal condition of a firm (Harrigan 1982). By 
normal condition of a firm, we mean the potential expected growth condition 
(relative to its industry) that a firm would undergo if the termination event had not 
occurred (see section 5.4). In return, highly-affected resources are highly 
misaligned with the rest of a firm’s resources and result in a reduction in different 
aspects of firm performance, such as financial performance.  
 
In the following section, we model the post-divorce behavior of a failed party 
drawing on the motion theory of physics.  
 
 
5.6 Modeling a Firm’s Post-Failure Behavior  
 
To discuss the ways in which a firm can address the problems that arise from a 
specific failed terminated alliance, we draw on the motion theory of classical 
physics. To justify our approach, it is worth mentioning that organizational scholars 
have drawn on natural science laws and theories (e.g., Dooley and Van de Ven 
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1999) and that these conceptualizations and metaphors have been a great help in 
understanding complex organizational and social phenomena (Mintzberg 1977). 
Drawing on the motion theory of physics, we try to develop a series of responses 
that a failed party could consider to help it overcome post-failure crisis. 
 
Motion theory addresses how objects move and what forces affect that movement. 
For the purposes of our study, we assess a case in which a vehicle moves, similar to 
a firm conducting its business (See Figure5.1). In a normal condition, a vehicle 
moves due to moving forces produced by its engine. Similarly, a firm does its 
business based on its value-creating resources. The question is what will happen 
when a firm terminates a strategic alliance in failure. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 A Moving Vehicle (the normal, stable growth condition of a firm) 
 
For the case of failure, we can think about a specific case in which a vehicle, due to 
an event such as an accident, partly loses its engine power and fails to continue in 
	  
	   	  
Moving	  
forces 
Vehicle’s normal condition in movement 
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the same condition as before. The vehicle loses the force that pushes it forward; 
additionally, due to the accident, the vehicle may become deformed and lose its 
aerodynamic state. Similarly, in a firm’s post-failure situation, depending on the 
importance of the failed strategic relationship, a part of the firm’s resources is 
affected (similar to a vehicle losing its engine’s moving force and having its body 
deformed). For example, either R&D-in-progress projects (shared with an ex-party) 
for already-accepted contracts or production lines dependent on a backward 
relationship could stop working, thus leading a firm into a crisis situation (e.g. 
Gulati et al. 2008).  
 
However, the basic question is: how can a firm address the problem in such a 
condition? In the case of the vehicle, we can see that after the problem, the vehicle 
does not stop quickly because it still has some moving inertia (due to the vehicle’s 
previous state of motion) (see Figure5.2). This movement inertia, as a positive 
force, still gives the vehicle a chance to continue; the driver will have a chance to 
turn on the engine (if it has stopped) and create (new) moving forces. Similarly, in 
the case of alliance termination, once a firm fails in its alliance, it does not quickly 
go into bankruptcy and exit the business (assuming that termination does not 
completely cripple the firm). However, due to current working resources (e.g., non-
affected, working, and still usable resources), the firm, as the beneficiary of moving 
inertia, could have an opportunity to continue its activities and create moving forces 
to address the problem and overcome the crisis. As a result, there are two forms of 
   
 
135 
forces that can help a firm to address post-failure problems: (1) moving inertia; and 
(2) creating (new) moving forces.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 After-Failure Vehicle Condition  
 
Considering a firm’s survival and growth as our dependent variables, and moving 
inertia and new moving forces as our independent variables, the following equation 
can be proposed in relation to a firm’s crisis condition: 
 
Firm Growth Condition and Survival = f(Moving inertia + (new) Moving forces) 
 
Regarding the discussion set forth here, the basic question is how managers can 
look for these types of resources. In the next section, we explain that the level of 
dynamism and stasis of different resource bundles within a firm can be considered 
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as both a basis and a helpful guide in creating maneuvering space for the two 
forces.  
 
 
5.7 Maneuvering Space and Dynamism of Resources  
 
According to our identified factors based on motion theory, after termination 
managers need to quickly identify where they can find these two main forces 
(moving inertia and possible (new) moving forces). Moving inertia implies that 
managers do not need to change a bundle of resources but that they can benefit 
from those “still value creating” and non-or low-affected resources resulting from 
previously implemented strategies (Boeker 1989). However, in the case of moving 
forces, managers do need to change bundles of resources to be able to create (new) 
moving forces. Considering a quick and reasonable response as the critical factor 
in a crisis (Yu et al. 2008, Weick 1993, Pearson and Clair 1998) and pointing out 
that the effect of managers’ responses is subject to changes in firm resources, the 
change speed of the resources bundles becomes the center of attention.  
 
We draw on strategic flexibility studies in the strategic management literature to 
discuss the change speed of resource bundles (Harrigan 1985, Volberda 1996, Lee 
and Makhija 2009, Volberda et al. 2001, Reuer and Leiblein 2000). Strategic 
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flexibility has been defined as the ability to respond quickly to risks and 
uncertainties within a firm and its environment (Volberda et al. 2001, Grewal and 
Tansuhaj 2001, Lee and Makhija 2009). It helps a firm to change rapidly by 
modifying its current condition to meet the new emergent needs (Wright and Snell 
1998, Miller and Shamsie 1996). The literature has discussed the fact that firms can 
use different strategies to create an appropriate level of flexibility, including 
organization design (Volberda 1996), formation of alliances (Goodstein et al. 
1996), and formation of subsidiaries (Lee and Makhija 2009). In this research line, 
speed has been considered to be one of the critical aspects of flexibility (Volberda 
1996) where quick responses are necessary due to unexpected events.  
 
To open up the discussion of the change speed of resource bundles, we distinguish 
between a bundle of resources itself and its level of specificity, which are discussed 
below. 
 
Regarding the resource bundle itself, we point to different types of resource 
bundles. For example, interorganizational relationships (IORs) as bundles of 
resources can be classified as market transactions, alliances, or mergers and 
acquisitions (Williamson 1979). Similarly, structure can be classified into two 
forms: mechanistic (e.g., hierarchical) or organic (e.g., hybrid). Culture can be 
classified as open versus conservative; and technology can be classified as specific 
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or general (Volberda 1996). Due to their inherent flexibility (e.g., structural 
flexibility) (Volberda 1997), some bundles can be (re)mobilized (Volberda et al. 
2001) faster than others from one type to another. For example, due to their hybrid 
structure, alliances are easier to form and dissolved than are mergers or acquisitions 
(Williamson 1979) and give a firm speedier change. As another example, a hybrid 
organization structure, as different parts are loosely coupled with each other, can be 
(re)mobilized into a new type faster than a hierarchical structure, ceteris paribus 
(Volberda 1996).  
 
However, the specificity level of a bundle refers to the variety of contexts in which 
it can be applied (Volberda 1996). For example, consider a multi-skilled versus a 
single-skilled employee. The former type of employee can be assigned to a variety 
of positions within a firm (Volberda 1996). However, in the case of the single-
skilled employee, the firm may not be able to (re)assign her if the tasks required in 
the new position are not similar to her previous tasks (Evans 1991, Volberda 1997). 
In this case, there is no change in the type of bundle (i.e., the employee does not 
change), but depending on its specificity level, the bundle can be (re)assigned in 
other conditions and directions. It is worth mentioning that we consider the level of 
specificity as the indicator of change speed in crisis (e.g., the multi-skilled 
employees discussed above) and keep constant the effect of available opportunities, 
post-termination, within which the bundles can be applied.  
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As a result, in our study (re)mobilization refers to a change in a bundle of resources 
itself that may be followed by a change in its specificity level, whereas 
(re)assignment refers to a change to which an already existing bundle of resources 
is applied. Regarding the above explanations of bundles of resources and their 
levels of specificity, we divide different bundles of resources into static and 
dynamic categories, which are discussed below.   
 
By static resources, we mean those resources that have both: (1) a lower speed of 
change relative to the change speed of the environment due to their lower level of 
flexibility; and (2) a high level of specificity. Due to these two specifications, 
during a crisis decision-makers are subject to the static nature of these resources, 
which push those decision-makers to use them only in a condition very similar to 
the original situation (Evans 1991, Volberda 1997). For example, structures formed 
through mergers and acquisitions, hierarchical organization structures, and mass 
production lines designed for economies of scale cannot be changed rapidly 
(Volberda 1996, Gulati et al. 2008) after the termination point. As a result, in a 
crisis it is not possible to quickly change these resources, which remain relatively 
static.  
 
In return, dynamic resources are those that can be (re)mobilized and/or have a low 
level of specificity to be (re)assigned quickly to manage the post-termination 
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condition. For example, strategic alliances (Williamson 1979) or hybrid forms of 
organizational structures (Volberda 1996, Volberda et al. 2001), multi-skilled 
employees or general technologies (Volberda 1996), and dynamic capabilities 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Volberda 1996) after the point of termination can be 
quickly (re)mobilized or (re)assigned, depending on the response implemented by 
managers. These resources provide the necessary degrees of freedom for the failed 
party to change (Das and Elango 1995) in a crisis. We emphasize that the concepts 
of dynamism and stasis are relative and depending on the environment of the firm 
(e.g., whether it is in a high- or low-velocity industry), different bundles of 
resources can be considered as static or dynamic (e.g., Pavitt 1984). 
 
Based on the above discussion, in Table 5.1 we identify the maneuvering space of 
managers during crisis. The Table 5.1 shows whether there is a need for change and 
whether it is possible for a firm’s resources to change. In the case of moving inertia, 
there is no need for change. Therefore, both types of resources (dynamic and static) 
can be used because both have moving inertia. However, in the case of new moving 
forces, there is a need for change, whereas only dynamic resources have the 
possibility of change. In this condition, managers have to consider the amount of 
these dynamic resources that must be kept in their previous state and how the 
amount that must be changed to create new moving forces. This discussion directs 
us to the following propositions: 
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Proposition 1: At a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is in crisis, the 
moving inertia of both static and dynamic resources can help the party to survive 
and maintain it growth condition.  
 
Proposition 2: After a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is in crisis, 
dynamic resources can be (re)mobilized to create new moving forces to survive and 
maintain its growth condition.  
 
 
                         Static: 
             Cannot be changed 
                 Dynamic: 
            Can be changed 
Moving Inertia: 
No need for change 
          Feasible Response Space 
 Feasible Response Space 
New Moving Forces: 
Need for change 
                     Infeasible 
 
Table 5.1 Maneuvering Space of Response during Crisis 
 
In the following section, we provide further propositions related to crisis 
management. 
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5.8 The Affectedness/Dynamism Taxonomy of Resources 
 
In this section, we provide a taxonomy of the affectedness/dynamism of resources 
that is applied under the umbrella of classical motion theory. By resources we mean 
a firm’s strategic resources, i.e., those resources that can significantly affect the 
firm’s performance during a crisis. Eisenhardt (1989) has referred to strategic 
resources as those that “(1) involve strategic positioning, (2) have high stakes, and 
(3) involve as many functions of the firm as possible”. For example, a firm’s 
reputation, strategy, culture, and technology all can be considered as strategic 
resources, depending on the context within which the firm is active.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that we are not limiting ourselves to resources 
that can create competitive advantage, i.e., those that are only valuable, inimitable, 
rare, or un-substitutable (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993). In a crisis condition, 
however, we look for every type of resource that can play a major role in dealing 
with post-terminated alliance difficulties and in overcoming the condition of crisis. 
Based on the classifications (Affectedness/Dynamism) discussed earlier, we 
identify four quadrants: (1) static-healthy; (2) dynamic-healthy; (3) static-
unhealthy; and (4) dynamic-unhealthy (Table 5.2). In the following section, we 
discuss the mechanisms that a firm’s healthy resources can contribute to alleviate 
post-termination difficulties.  
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Firm’s Resources Static Resources Dynamic Resources 
Not- (Low-) Affected 
Resources 
(Healthy Resources) 
1 2 
Highly-Affected Resources 
(Unhealthy Resources) 3 4 
 
Table 5.2 Affectedness/Dynamism Taxonomy 
 
5.8.1 Static-Healthy Resources  
 
The first group of resources, are those (1) with low speed of change and (2) a high 
level of specificity (defined as static before) that have not been affected due to the 
failed terminated alliance. In addition, because these resources are strategic, they 
can play a significant role in addressing a failed party’s post-termination 
difficulties. For example, assuming a low-velocity industry with a low rate of 
technological change, a firm’s valuable technology can be considered as a bundle of 
static-healthy resources that still can contribute to profit-making during a crisis. As 
discussed earlier, these static-positive resources can create a beneficial moving 
inertia in maintaining a firm’s growth in the crisis period (Boeker 1989). The 
resources provide a firm with the ability, in a short-time crisis condition, to not lose 
everything at once and to formulate a “reasoned response” (Klarner and Raisch 
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2013) despite its need for rapid change (Haleblian et al. 2006, Boeker 1989) after an 
alliance is terminated.  
 
If a firm’s culture has a beneficial effect at the time of crisis, that culture can be 
considered a static-healthy resource (Volberda 1997). In this regard, Aupperle 
(1996) has referred to organizational culture as a type of static variable where there 
is a need for rapid changes. In his metaphorical analysis, the author refers to the 
culture of Greek soldiers as having three main unique characteristics: integration, 
differentiation, and ambiguity. Aupperle (1996) has argued that these positive 
characteristics helped the soldiers to repeatedly reorganize themselves to escape 
from Persian lands under a condition of crisis. As a similar condition after a failed 
terminated alliance, an organization’s culture can help employees to remain unified, 
absorb the need for rapid changes, and be more supportive (Aupperle 1996) to 
overcome a post-termination crisis. For example, employees can continue with 
lower level of wages and extra hours during the crisis, especially if their firm 
experiences financial problems due to a failed terminated alliance.  
 
Technologies and firm assets with a low speed of change that are applied within a 
firm (Volberda 1996), while still valuable, can be considered as another group of 
static resources that contribute to positive inertia during a crisis. These types of 
resources often require high initial investments (Harrigan 1981, Harrigan 1982) 
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and/or are large in size (Kim and Kuilman 2013), which make them relatively static 
to change. For example, available distribution channels, resources with large sizes 
and high value, or a current mass production line with an up-to-date technology, 
while still serving previous customers, can help a firm to achieve a minimum level 
of profit and thus overcome a crisis. As mentioned earlier, due to the static nature 
and high level of these bundles of resources, they cannot be changed quickly and 
must be used either in their previous locations or in very similar locations (Das and 
Elango 1995).  
 
Finally, static-healthy resources can also be used as a basis for (re)mobilizing 
(Volberda et al. 2001) other, dynamic-healthy resources. For example, in the case 
of a failure in a forward strategic alliance, current products, distribution channels, 
and technologies (as static-healthy resources) can be used to find new customers. In 
other words, these are static-healthy resources (e.g., low-speed, attractive firm 
technologies) that can guarantee a firm’s performance in creating new alliances. It 
is important for us to stress that these static-healthy resources are the main basis on 
which some dynamic-healthy resources such as new alliance formation capabilities 
are (re)mobilized (meaning that the dynamic-healthy resources are not being 
mobilized on their own, which is the case in the next section). As a result, we 
expect: 
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Proposition 3: After a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is crisis, the 
moving inertia of static-healthy resources can help the firm to survive and maintain 
its growth condition. 
 
Proposition 4: After a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is in crisis, 
firm static-healthy resources can become a basis for (re)mobilizing and reassigning 
dynamic-healthy resources.  
 
5.8.2 Dynamic-Healthy Resources 
 
New moving forces are another group of forces that can help a firm after the 
termination of an alliance. Dynamic-healthy resources are those that can contribute 
to the creation of these new forces. When a firm descends into crisis condition, its 
dynamic resources, on their own, can become the basis for dealing with post-
termination difficulties. We divide these dynamic resources into two groups: (1) 
naturally dynamic resources and (2) dynamic capabilities (Rindova and Kotha 
2001, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece et al. 1997).  
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5.8.2.1 Naturally Dynamic Resources 
 
We refer to this group as naturally dynamic resources due to the dynamism inherent 
in their nature, which provides a firm with the ability to (re)mobilize or (re)assign 
these resources quickly after the point of termination. This group of resources has 
either a high speed of change or a low level of specificity. A firm’s internal 
structure can be considered as an example of this group of resources. For example, 
a hybrid form of organization structure can be considered as a dynamic bundle of 
resources where it allows for quick reconfiguration and reorganization (Volberda 
1997). In this case, because different sections within a firm are loosely coupled, a 
hybrid organizational structure can give the firm an opportunity to rapidly 
(re)mobilize itself in response to necessary changes (Volberda et al. 2001). In fact, 
the flexibility inherent in this structure gives the firm the possibility of rapidly 
transforming itself (Volberda 1996) and absorbing the difficulties of a terminated 
alliance. 
 
Regarding dynamism due to the level of specificity, multi-skilled employees and 
general technologies or assets active within a firm can be considered as some 
examples of this group of resources. Due to their broader level of abilities, multi-
skilled employees can be (re)assigned, if necessary, more easily and quickly 
(Volberda 1996). Similarly, general technologies and assets applied within a firm 
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due to their lower level of specificity, which provide a broader range of 
applications, can be more quickly (re)assigned to new or current activities 
(Volberda 1996). In fact, through a broader level of usages these resources give a 
firm the required level of flexibility to perform necessary reassignments (Evans 
1991) and overcome difficulties after termination. In the following section, we 
clarify the last group of dynamic resources: dynamic capabilities.  
 
5.8.2.2 Dynamic Capabilities 
 
The second group of dynamic resources is composed of resources that give a firm 
the ability to reorganize and reorient all of the other forms of static and naturally 
dynamic resources to create new moving forces (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece 
et al. 1997, Volberda 1996). Volberda (1996) and Volberda et al. (2001) has 
referred to managerial capabilities in this regard and has noted that these dynamic 
resources provide a firm with the ability to reorient and transform itself to respond 
rapidly to changes in its environment. Similarly, Sanchez (1995) has addressed the 
abilities that help a firm to redefine its (product) strategies and reorganize itself by 
resynthesizing its resources. This second group of resources primarily helps firms 
to generate methods of reorganization that take their short- and long-term 
performance into consideration (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
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The second role of dynamic resources is to help firms to address less-specific 
affected resources. By less-specific affected resources, we mean those resources 
freed due to the termination of an alliance that still have the opportunity to be 
reassigned into current or new situations. In this regard, dynamic (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000) and managerial capabilities (Volberda 1996) help firms to plan for 
resources to meet their short- and long-term conditions. For example, in 
considering its situation, a failed party may decide to either start a new product or 
reinforce its current products. In this case, required resources can be partly 
reassigned from unhealthy resources to advance a firm in a crisis condition. 
Morrow Jr. et al. (2007), addressing the condition of a declining firm with an 
unsatisfactory performance, has found that its valuable and difficult-to-imitate 
actions, through recombining existing resource bundles to develop new products, 
can meet investors’ short-term expectations. 
 
These explanations direct us to formulate the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 5: After a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is in crisis, its 
dynamic-healthy resources can be (re)mobilized to create new moving forces to 
support the firm’ survival and growth condition. 
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Proposition 6: After a failed terminated alliance, when a failed party is in crisis, its 
dynamic-healthy resources support it in reassigning unhealthy resources.  
 
5.8.3 Unhealthy Resources 
 
It is interesting to consider how the change speed of less-affected resources can 
play a positive role for a firm in times of crisis. In this section, we primarily focus 
on the speed of (re)assigning affected resources in new or current places within a 
firm. For example, if current assets within an affected project (due to a failed 
terminated alliance) are no longer useful, they can be (re)assigned to other current 
or new projects. However, not all assets can be reassigned with the same speed 
because they may be either dynamic or static. In addition, not all of these resources 
can provide the same level of value when they are reassigned; some may have a 
higher level of value than the others. Finally, it may be impossible to use all of 
these resources because during a crisis, the locations to which they can be 
reassigned may be limited. As a result, to survive a crisis and obtain higher levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness, a failed party needs to consider the trade-off between 
the value and the speed of (re)assigning these affected resources (Speed * Value = 
Effectiveness and Efficiency).  
 
This discussion directs us to the following proposition:  
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Proposition 7: After a failed terminated alliance, when a firm experiences crisis, it 
needs to consider the trade-off between the speed and the value of (re)assigning 
affected resources to overcome the condition of crisis. 
 
 
5.9 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
The literature has identified strategic alliances as one of the dominant strategies of 
the previous three decades (Bruner and Spekman 1998, Gulati and Singh 1998). 
Such alliances are set up for different objectives, such as risk-sharing or access to 
complementary resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Meanwhile, 
currently competitive markets have pushed companies to form and manage a 
portfolio of alliances to access a broader range of resources (Wassmer 2010, 
Wassmer and Dussauge 2011). Although alliances are highly popular, they are 
double-edged swords and their rate of failure is quite high. Some studies report that 
up to 50-60 % of alliances terminate in failure (e.g., Das and Teng 2000a; Gulati et 
al. 2008). Despite this high rate of failure and the possibly destructive impact of a 
dissolved alliance, the alliance-termination literature has been remarkably silent 
about the post-divorce condition of failed parties (Gulati et al. 2008).  
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In this study, drawing on the motion theory of physics and looking at the change 
speed of firms’ resources, we provide a theoretical framework related to the 
possible behavior of a failed party after termination. We primarily discuss two main 
types of forces that help a failed party to overcome the difficulties of a failed 
dissolved alliance: moving inertia and new moving forces. Moving inertia is the 
positive result of previously implemented strategies that still push the firm forward 
during a crisis. It enables a failed party to continue its activities (at a minimum 
level) while giving it space to create new moving forces. In managing these two 
forces, we have discussed the change speed of resources as an underlying factor 
that helps to both distinguish resources that have moving inertia and specify and 
prioritize those resources that can be used to create new moving forces.  
 
In fact, the change speed of resources helps firms to identify “where the firm has 
the possibility of change” by identifying those resources that can be changed 
quickly during a crisis. This is where managers must identify how much moving 
inertia is available and should be used, while at the same time they must identify 
the amount of new moving force that is possible and should be created to overcome 
the crisis. It is worth mentioning that our theory mainly contributes to the 
management of failed/dissolved alliances in the strategic alliance literature by 
describing the condition of failed parties and the ways that their managers can 
overcome the resulting crises. In addition, we have introduced motion theory into 
management studies as a very novel approach from classical physics.  
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Our study also has some managerial implications. First, it emphasizes that a crisis 
following the dissolution of an alliance, which is a very likely situation, must be 
addressed by managers (even) at the time of alliance formation (Gulati et al. 2008). 
Second, it notes different forms of difficulties that a failed party may experience 
due to a failed dissolved alliance and the way that these difficulties can be 
addressed using firm resources. Third, it advises managers to have a broader 
perspective and formulate their strategies to both cover adverse unexpected extreme 
cases (e.g., a failed/dissolved strategic alliance) and be able to benefit from the 
positive impact of their previous strategies. This approach helps managers not to 
lose control of everything at once and to be able to respond more reasonably 
(Klarner and Raisch 2013) during a crisis. Fourth, our study addresses the change 
speed of resources as a way in which managers can identify and manage the speed 
of changes under a crisis condition in which a rapid response is highly valued.  
 
In conclusion, we note that this study can be considered as an initial theoretical 
framework for future theoretical and empirical studies in the area of 
failed/terminated alliances. Moreover, our very novel perspective from classical 
physics provides the chance to connect two streams of natural and social sciences 
together which opens the door for further contributions from theories in natural 
sciences. 
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Chapter 6: 
Discussion  
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6.1 Discussion  
 
In this thesis, as one of the central debates in strategic management literature, we 
approached the firm growth and responded to the following question ‘how do firms 
grow sustainably in dynamic environments?’. The inquiry on the firm’s growth has 
been at center of attention in strategy studies since firms not only are interested in 
making rent once, they also want to keep the stream of rent as the base of their 
sustainable growth over time (Crook et al. 2008, Barney 1991). Several schools of 
thought in the strategy literature, to the date, have contributed to this inquiry 
specially those focusing on the firm or industry attributes (Conner 1991).  
 
Resource-based school of thought has been one of the main streams of studies 
focusing on the firm attributes (Barney 1991, Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984, 
Peteraf 1993). It basically brings the role of firm internal resources at the center of 
attention (Barney 1991, Penrose 1959) and points out those resources that could be 
the source of sustainable competitive advantage. Central to the RBV, Barney 
(1991), defining resources as processes, capabilities, knowledge, physical assets, 
etc. proposes that those resources that are Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-
substitutable (VRIN) can help the firm to make rent sustainably. 
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The stated resources guarantee the possibility of value and rent making by 
providing the firm with a better level of efficiency and effectiveness. They also help 
the firm to sustainably keep its rent by being rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
(Barney 1991). Inimitability delivers that it will be difficult for other firms to 
imitate these resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989), rareness addresses that not many 
firms have such resources; and finally, not the resources of other firms can 
substitute the firm resources over time (Barney 1991).  
 
Over the years, dozen of studies have been conducted on RBV and the results have 
supported the central debate by Barney (1991) that those firms with VRIN 
resources have shown a better performance relative to other firms (Newbert 2007, 
Crook et al. 2008). Looking at these results, Barney et al. (2011) discuss the RBV 
has got to a level of maturity and it can be revitalized into new directions and area. 
For that, the authors point out the need for further research and suggest the 
possibility of combining RBV with other theories or exploring new phenomena as 
possible ways of expanding the theory.  
 
In line with Barney et al. (2011), two more critiques to the RBV could be 
addressed: firstly, while the RBV supports the role of VRIN resources on the firm 
sustained competitive advantage and growth (Barney 1991), it rather stays silent in 
dynamic environments characterized with rapid technological changes and shorter 
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product life cycles (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Wang and 
Ahmed 2007). Due to these rapid changes, resources lose their value and cannot be 
held as a source of sustained competitive advantage. Secondly, while the studies in 
the literature focus on VRIN resources that result in the firm’s higher performance, 
the question on how resources grow has been less valued to the present (Barney et 
al. 2011, Ambrosini et al. 2009).  
 
The note by Barney et al. (2011) and the critics addressed above directed us to 
develop a thesis based on three studies and point out various aspects of the firm 
growth. The aim of thesis was to respond to the following question: ‘how do firms 
grow sustainably in dynamic environments?’. Our thesis provides a strong base on 
the growth of the firm by addressing firstly how a firm grows sustainably through 
providing a theoretical base and describing the growth characteristics (first study).  
Then, we supported the theory in a real setting (second study). Finally, we 
addressed a condition of divorce interrupting the firm growth and discussed how 
the firm could go back to its normal condition (third study). 
 
In the first study (chapter 4), as addressed by Barney et al. (2011) regarding the 
possibility of combining the RBV with other perspectives, we provided a new 
theoretical approach on the growth of the firm and dealt with some of problematic 
aspects of the RBV. Through reviewing a large number of relevant studies, we 
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contributed to the literature by bringing an open-system theory into the RBV. 
Drawing on the theory, we considered the firm as a bundle of continuously moving 
resources as a part of a bigger environment of moving resources. Then, we 
described how the firm resources grow over time accumulatively and through its 
interaction with its external environment. We discussed the characteristics that 
resources show over their growth and provided a review of representative studies 
from the literature. We ended our first inquiry by commenting on the heterogeneity 
of firm resources.  
 
Our theory introduced some new aspects. First, the settlement of the RBV in the 
body of the open-system perspective can be considered as one of the most unique 
contributions of the thesis in the literature as a new theoretical approach (Barney et 
al. 2011). It explained how a firm, as a bundle of resources, grows through internal 
resource accumulation and interaction with its external environment. We discussed 
growth has an unknown nature and commented on the pace of firm growth. In 
addition, our theory gave a dynamic nature to the RBV and brought capabilities at 
the heart of the theory (Wang and Ahmed 2006).  
 
Furthermore, our first study showed how the firm has to continuously change its 
resources.  For that, we proposed a framework of new product development to 
address the changing needs of the environment. Our theory opened up a way to 
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have a more elaborate approach to the RBV and capabilities, as noted by Barney et 
al. (2011). Overall, considering that research on the RBV and capabilities are still 
ongoing, our first study (chapter 3) advanced the field by providing a new 
formulation of the theory based on an open system theory, as the main theoretical 
basis of this thesis.  
 
In accordance with the first study (chapter 3) that provided a new perspective on 
how firms grow, the second study (chapter 4) addressed the lack of empirical 
inquiries in this area (Barney et al. 2011, Danneels 2011, Ambrosini and Bowman 
2009). It supported and extended our base theory in the case of the commercial 
aircraft sector. This was a relevant contribution to the literature since growth had 
remained to some extent unexplored as previous studies had focused on the firm’s 
decline (e.g., Danneels 2011, Narayanan et al. 2009). As a result, we conducted a 
case study to empirically investigate the growth of Airbus consortium over 20 years 
(from 1967 to 1987).  
 
This study extended the literature regarding the fact that prior studies had asked 
how the accumulation of resources could contribute to the firm sustained growth 
(Danneels 2011). Accordingly, the results of our study showed that the piecemeal 
and incremental accumulation of resources contributed to the sustainable growth of 
Airbus consortium from when it was formed as a consortium between its partners 
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since 1967 to when it became a pioneer in the commercial aviation sector in 1987. 
Our findings extended the literature by showing the role that three cycles of new 
product development had in the accumulation process. The results additionally 
supported how the commonality strategy helped and improved the performance of 
Airbus during this period.  
 
Finally, our results yielded two primary periods of growth for Airbus: (1) spark and 
establishment and (2) technological advancements. Firstly, the paper showed how 
Airbus after almost 10 years became a strong player from a vulnerable partnership, 
through the development and settlement of its first aircraft. In addition, it showed 
how Airbus brought additional technological advances became the base of its 
competitive advantage in the second decade and afterwards.  
 
The two studies directed us to the last study. As our third study, we contributed to 
the literature through addressing the post-divorce crisis of a strategic alliance. The 
condition was important since an unexpected divorce could interrupt the firm 
growth regarding the concern of thesis on the firm sustained growth. In addition, it 
was a new phenomenon that has not been addressed to the present (Barney et al. 
2011). While prior studies in the literature had addressed various aspects of 
alliances such as formation (e.g. Das and Teng 2000) or how these alliances are 
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terminated (e.g., Harrison 2004, Gulati et al. 2008), both the RBV and alliance 
literatures were silent on the post-divorce crisis of strategic alliances.  
 
In the third study, through a thorough review of studies in the area, we filled the 
gap by addressing the following items: firstly we described the post-divorce crisis 
of a failed party and discussed how the divorce would affect the party’s resources. 
Then, we advanced the literature by discussing the forces that could help the firm in 
the crisis drawing on classic physics as a novel approach and contribution to the 
literature. Finally, we discussed how the party, according to the characteristics of its 
resources, could manage the crisis and go back to its previous growth condition. 
Our study was relevant since a post-divorce crisis is a very probable condition that 
could happen to any party entering into an alliance (Singh and Mitchel 1996). For 
example, the literature shows that more than 50 percent of alliances end in failure 
(Das and Teng 2000b) and the divorce crisis could interrupt the firm growth and 
direct the firm outside its business (Gulati et al. 2008, Harrison 2004). Our study 
was the first study in the literature addressing such condition which had neglected 
to the present (Gulati et al. 2008).  
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Lines of 
Research 
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7.1 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Lines of Research  
 
Responding to the question ‘how do firms grow sustainably in dynamic 
environments?’, in this thesis through three concrete studies we elaborated different 
aspects of the firm growth. We approached the question of our inquiry from the 
resource-based school of thought that considers the firm internal resources as the 
source of firm sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993). The 
RBV basically considers Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-substitutable (VRIN) 
resources as the source of firm sustainable rent making and discuss those firms 
holding these resources show a better performance relative to other firms (Barney 
1991). Valuable resources are the base of firm rent making while at the same time 
being rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable support the sustainability of these 
resources. 
 
Over the last two decades, empirical studies in the literature supported the higher 
performance of firms with VRIN resources as central debate by Barney (1991) 
(Crook et al. 2008).  In this line, Barney et al. (2011), looking at these studies, 
discuss RBV has got to a level of maturity and suggest to revitalize RBV through 
combining it with other perspectives or explaining new phenomena. In addition, 
while the studies in RBV mainly discuss the resources that contribute to the firm 
sustained competitive advantage, the question on how resources grow particularly 
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in the case of dynamic environments have remained rather unexplored (Wang and 
Ahmed 2006). As a result, we developed three studies to respond ‘how do firms 
grow sustainably in dynamic environments?’ and contributed to the literature as 
follows: 
 
Our first study contributed to the literature by bringing open system theory into the 
conversation of the RBV through a discussion on how firms grow sustainably in 
dynamic environments. Looking at the firm from a resource perspective and open 
system theory, we considered the firm as a bundle of moving resources as a part of 
a bigger environment of moving resources. We addressed how resources grow in 
the setting of open-system theory by addressing several aspects, mainly the 
accumulation of resources, the interaction of the firm with its external environment, 
its unknown nature, and finally the pace of the firm’s growth. In addition, we 
described the characteristics that resources show during their growth and finally 
commented on firms’ heterogeneity. The study provided a base for further empirical 
studies in the literature and contributed to improve various aspects of the RBV. 
 
Our second study, in line with the previous study, filled the gap related to the lack 
of empirical studies in the strategy literature. It supported the idea of sustainable 
growth of the firm in the commercial aircraft sector through presenting how Airbus 
had been able to manage the accumulation of its resources to be able to experience 
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a sustainable growth over the period of the study. Our results show how the 
piecemeal and incremental accumulation of resources helped Airbus to experience a 
sustainable growth through developing new aircrafts and technologies. The 
approach helped Airbus to benefit from economies of scale and scope over its 
growth and in addition to that to be able to meet the requirements of its market.  
 
While our study on Airbus yielded fruitful results on how firms accumulate 
resources contributing to their sustained growth, it had one limitation. We used only 
one case that might limit the generalization of our results. However, it is worth 
mentioning that our primary aim was to explore and provide a better picture of the 
processes contributing to the sustainable growth of Airbus. In fact, the study gave 
us the chance to deeply evaluate different aspects of Airbus growth and provide 
reliable explanations on processes contributing to the growth over the period of 
study. In addition, while the study covers the commercial aircraft sector, there is the 
possibility of conducting further studies in other industries as a possible way of 
contributing to the literature.  
 
Finally, our third study contributed to resource-based literature through clarifying 
an unexpected terminated alliance where the alliance party gets into crisis and as a 
result it needs to respond quickly to the crisis. We discussed how an appropriate 
management of resources, based on the change speed of resources, could help the 
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firm to go outside the condition of crisis. In the study, we firstly discussed what the 
difficulties of a terminated alliance would be, and then provided the related 
processes explaining how the firm would have the chance to face the crisis. The 
study emphasized that as an important issue, managers should consider about the 
termination of their alliances, even before their formation. Finally, the study was 
timely and provided a theoretical base for further empirical studies in the literature 
for the firms that have got into crisis after their divorce. These studies can further 
support and enrich our discussions in further empirical settings.  
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